Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witness by Character Evidence in Missouri by Bishop, Arthur N., Jr.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 2 April 1955 Article 3 
1955 
Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witness by Character 
Evidence in Missouri 
Arthur N. Bishop Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur N. Bishop Jr., Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witness by Character Evidence in Missouri, 20 
MO. L. REV. (1955) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 




BY CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN1 MISSOURI
ARHnR N. BIsHOP, JR.*
This is a virgin problem in Missouri, insofar as analytic commentary
is concerned, but an ancient one in the courts. It has been examined in
other jurisdictions on even a broader scale,1 but, exclusive of exhaustive
investigations of reputation as regards the question of veracity under
oath,2 and of the proposed Missouri Evidence Code,8 the entire field
is an open one for review. Like an automobile which runs-but not
without effort, headache, and expense, it needs a mechanic-to that end
this venture is dedicated.
I. CHARACTER IN G ERAL
The rustic distinction that "character is what you are and reputa-
tion is what people think you are" has been glamorized, delineated,
scholastically expanded, and artificially synthethized, but it still remains
on the irrefutable subjective-objective standard: character is still what
one really is, and reputation is what one's fellow-citizens, his neighbors
in the community in which he resides or does business, think he is, be
it "bluenose", "nice guy", "rounder", "scoundrel", or worse. Probably
as scholarly a definition as any of character is this: 4
The aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and
distinguish an individual person; the general result of the one's
distinguishing attributes.
The same source defines reputation as follows: r,
Estimation in which one is held, the character imputed to
a person in the neighborhood where he lives.
*Member, Texas Bar.
1. Kauffman, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Maryland, 7
Mn. L. RPv. 118 (1948); Note, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Min-
nesota, 36 Miy. L. REv. 724 (1952); Oppenheim, The Admissibility of Character
Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching Witnesses in Criminal Prosecutions, 12 TuL.
L. REv. 286 (1938).
2. Wilkins, Impeaching a Witness by Showing His Reputation for Truth, 1
ST. Louis U. L. J. 277 (1951).
3. Nelkin, Impeachment and Rehabilitation, 14 Mo. L. REv. 291 (1949).
4. BLACis'S LAw DicTioNAaY 294 (4th ed. 1951).
5. Id., p. 1467.
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Hence, the simple description remains unshaken. The courts, however,
while admitting that character and reputation are not the same,6 have
not yet been furnished with the projected "psycho-X-ray eye" which
enables them to peer through the cranium into the cortex of the human
brain to ascertain what a witness really is. Consequently, they must
resort to a general form of accentuated hearsay called reputation to
determine the veracity qualities of a witness offered them purportedly
to tell all the truth he knows about a matter in question. After the
sugar of the counsel pro, the salt of the counsel con, and the embalming
oil of the court itself, the witness, in chaotic consternation, after intro-
duction, examination, cross-examination, impeachment, redirect examina-
tion, rehabilitation, and penitence, is supposed to tell his collective father-
confessor, the jury, what is, in law, called the truth: namely, that to
which neither side objects, excepts, or raises an eyebrow. All this we
call a part of character evidence.
For purposes of the law of evidence one must acquire character in
the eyes of the general populace in which he resides, does business, or
visits at frequent intervals over a prolonged period.7 That there are no
arbitrary geographical or natural boundaries to this neighborhood was
ably pointed out by Blair, J., in the leading case of Ulrich v. Chicago,
Burlington Quincy R. Co.,8 involving an action for personal injuries,
wherein plaintiff was jarred loose from his footing by the impact of other
cars switched into the one he was boarding. He had been a resident of
6. 3 WIGrOaE, EVmncE § 920 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Id., § 930; 3 JoNES, EviDNcs IN CiVm CASES § 859 (4th ed. 1938); Note, Ad-
missibility of Reputation of Witness at Former Residence to Impeach or Sustain His
Testimony, 12 Awn. CAs. 395 (1909); State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 S.W. 895 (1894)
(Murder: defendant and one W engaged in controversy over winnings in horse race;
objection raised to favorable testimony as to good reputation of witness S in commu-
nity; held, one acquainted with another's reputation for truth in neighborhood in
which such other resides may testify as to other's character); State v. Sebastian, 215
Mo. 58, 114 S.W. 522 (1908) (Murder: shooting of neighbor by farmer after dispute
over distribution of corn; exception to exclusion of prior commission of crime by
state's witness, one S; held, impeaching witness must be confined to the general
reputation of person impeached in the neighborhood where such person resides);
State v. Lynes, 194 Mo. App. 184, 185 S.W. 535 (1916) (Prosecution for making false
affidavit; defendant's grain elevator destroyed by fire, he making affidavit 2,000
bushels of wheat destroyed, but evidence contra showing only 400 bushels destroyed;
exception to admission of character evidence; held, witness living within 1 miles
of residence of impeached witness may testify as to such person's reputation for
truth and honesty).
8. 281 Mo. 697, 220 S.W. 682 (1920); semble: State v. McLaughlin, 149 Mo. 19,
50 S.W. 315 (1899) (Murder: defendant shot one M to death following drinking bout
in tavern owned by D; held, one living within five miles from a town may testify
as to a witness' general reputation for truth in such town, even though impeached
witness had moved away 1,% years prior).
1955]
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Iowa for about six years prior to the trial, but such residence was only
a few miles from his former residence in Missouri, and he was still well
known in the latter place because of frequent business he did there. His
complaint that impeaching character evidence should be confined to the
existing physical locus of residence was effaced by the holding that,
while evidence of reputation to impeach a witness is restricted to reputa-
tion in the neighborhood ("i.e., the territory in which he resides, moves,
circulates, does business, and has intercourse with his fellows"), that
neighborhood is not arbitrarily limited by geographical lines. Similarly,
one who has lived in a community twenty years acquires a reputation
therein which may be offered to impeach him as a witness in a trial occur-
ring three years after he moves elsewhere but does not establish a new
permanent residence.0 Reputation cannot be acquired in a community
where one is merely a visitor or transient 0 except where he has no per-
manent residence." Hence, the only logical rule which can be deduced
is that the wise discretion of the trial court is the omnipotent factor, as
confined only by the "prudent man" doctrine, and considering all the
circumstances as affected by the rule against hearsay. The place where
character (as manifested by reputation) is acquired, therefore, is one's
neighborhood of residence or business, be it urban blocks or rural acres,
where he is known by the general populace of the area, during an ap-
preciable period of time, regardless of the nature of the place.' 2
9. Lindsay v. Bates, 223 Mo. 294, 122 S.W. 682 (1909) (Action for malicious
prosecution following dismissed charge of arson, plaintiff excepting to the exclusion
of the deposition of one B, a co-defendant in the arson charge, plaintiff contending
the change of domiciles excluded impeaching evidence of reputation at the former
address).
10. Waddingham v. Hulett, 92 Mo. 528, 5 S.W. 27 (1887) (Action for money
loaned and for board of defendant and his two sons for fourteen years, plaintiff
attempting to show bad general reputation of the sons in Detroit, where they had
been on a three-month visit several years prior to the trial; held, the general reputa-
tion of a witness among his neighbors, i.e., those dwelling near him, is the only
legitimate subject of inquiry for impeaching his credit, evidence of reputation acquir-
ed at a distant place on a short visit being inadmissible).
31. State v. Cushenberry, 157 Mo. 168, 56 S.W. 737 (1900) Murder: defendant
shot a city marshal to death during attempted arrest following burglary, and excepted
to impeaching testimony that his witness B was "housebreaker"; held, where witness
is a nomad, gaining the reputation of being a "housebreaker" after only a few weeks'
residence in the community, such evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely
because of the short residence, for to refuse impeachment would allow him to testify
from the same plane as a reputable citizen).
12. Clementine v. State, 14 Mo. 112 (1857) (Prosecution for keeping bawdy
house; held, it is competent to prove the character of the women who live in such
house, and the character and behavior while there, of the men who frequent the
house, and also the effects of the establishment upon the peace, good order, and
enjoyment of the neighborhood); see also annotation in 90 A.L.R. 877 (1934).
[Vol. 20
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Nowhere is the rule against opinion more pronounced than in Mis-
souri.13 That character evidence must be confined absolutely to one's
general reputation in the community in which he resides has never been
doubted, and it has been held that even reputation for truth and veracity
acquired among a majority of his neighbors is inadmissible.1 4 What, then,
is admissible? Only the general community opinion, whatever that is,
as seen in the trial court's wise discretion, seems to fill the bill. No
standards are set and no lines drawn, but practicality dictates that the
trial court, which sees all the facts, hears all the stories, and determines
the truth as shown by the weight of testimony, should set the rule, absent
guiding standards. An excellent recent investigation of the subject1 5
recognizes the fact that few impeaching witnesses testify as to character
from an inner urge to see justice done, giving their coagulations of com-
munity opinion, rather, from malice. 16 As such, the rule against individ-
ual opinion should be altered to conform to the better jurisprudential
theory that any impeaching witness gives, at best, a biased point of view
of community opinion-without benefit of clergy, Gallup Poll, or accurate
measurement media-and such opinion cannot be covered up by legalistic
verbosity akin to an ostrich burying his head in the sand to prevent
observation of the world about him. All juries hearing impeaching evi-
dence against any witness, whether it be plaintiff in an action on the
common counts or defendant in a prosecution for a grisly murder in the
first degree, should be instructed carefully and cautioned as to the bias
element in such testimony, for "community opinion" on the witness
stand is only what the witness makes it, tempered, of course, by the
acidity of cross-examination and the possibility of compounding impeach-
ment upon impeachment, ad infinitum.
Time, the bejeweled emblem of the philosophical poet, is no less
fleeting in the element of character of a witness in the courtroom than
in the momentary capture of beauty that is forever preserved to man-
kind in the ageless replica of a Rembrandt masterpiece. What a person
13. See generally, Note, Right of Witness to Testify to Character from Personal
Knowledge, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 650; 58 Aam. JuR., Witnesses, § 727; Wilkins, note 2, supra.
14. Emory v. Phillips, 22 Mo. 499 (1856) (Action for conversion for carrying
away a house, brought by church trustees to recover church building; evidence as
to bad reputation of one of plaintiff's witnesses among majority of his neighbors held
properly excluded).
15. Wilkins, op. cit., note 2, supra.
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says, does, thinks, feels, and otherwise overtly manifests is etched for
all time in the memory of an enemy who subsequently is asked to give
his statement of "community opinion" of the actor to be impeached.
Fortunately for the unfortunate, justice has tipped her scales to place
a general stop-watch limit on how far back such "community opinion"
can go. The Missouri courts, in a virtualy unanimity of opinion, hold
that the character of the witness impeached must relate to the time when
the testimony is given, allowing prior character to be shown, provided
it is not too distant in time as to negative honest probative value in show-
ing present character.17 An examination of the cases reveals that char-
17. 3 WiG o E, op. cit., note 6, supra, §§ 927, 928 (adopting first rule cited in §
928); Wood v. Matthews, 73 Mo. 477 (1881) (Action on promissory note, the trial
being in 1878, defendant attempting to show bad character in 1875 of two of plaintiff's
witnesses; held, too remote); State v. McLaughlin, note 8, supra (Evidence that a
witness' reputation for truth was bad in a town in which he had done business for
eight months, ending 1 years prior to the trial, is competent impeaching evidence,
for the time required to establish character cannot be definitely fixed); State v.
Shouse, 188 Mo. 473, 87 S.W. 480 (1905) (Rape: defendant, convicted of intercourse
with stepdaughter, excepted to testimony of one B, who had known him in Tennessee
seven or eight years before the charge; held, when a witness testifies that he had no
knowledge of impeached person's reputation in the community where such person
now resides, it was improper to permit him to testify as to the person's reputation in
another state seven or eight years before); Lindsay v. Bates, note 9, supra (reputa-
tion three years prior to trial without permanent residence in the interim properly
admitted); State v. Starr, 244 Mo. 161, 148 S.W. 862 (1912) (Prosecution for obtaining
money by false pretenses, defendant stating to wealthy, elderly farmer that one S,
the husband of a woman with whom the farmer had been intimate, contemplated
action for alienation of affections and obtained money to "compromise" action;
defendant contended impeaching state's evidence should have been confined to his
reputation at the time of the trial; held, evidence of impeached person's reputation to
time of trial was admissible, and such inquiry was not confined merely to the time
before the commission of the offense); State v. Moreaux, 254 Mo. 398, 162 S.W. 158
(1913) (Prosecution for embezzlement; defendant excepting to admission of impeach-
ing testimony of Chicago police officers as to his bad reputation for five years pre-
ceding the trial, although they had no personal knowledge of him for four years
next preceding the trial; held, impeaching witnesses' statements of lack of knowledge
of defendant during the four years affected merely the weight of the testimony, not
the admissibility); Ulrich v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., note 8, supra (six
years prior to the trial not too remote if impeached party now lives only short dis-
tance from former residence, which he visits periodically); State v. Houston, 263 S.W.
219 (Mo. 1924) (statutory rape: defendant, convicted of carnal intercourse with his
15-year old daughter, sought to introduce niece's impeaching testimony of prose-
cutrix's reputation for truth and veracity more than four years before trial; held,
too remote); Johnson v. Martindale, 288 S.W. 970 (Mo. App. 1926) (Action on promis-
sory note, defendant pleading payment, and plaintiff excepting to impeaching evidence
as to bad reputation of his witness M some fifteen years prior; held, fifteen years
too remote for impeachment); State v. Richards, 11 S.W.2d 1035 (Mo. 1928) (Bur-
glary: defendant, convicted of stealing groceries from neighbor's home, attempted
to impeach prosecuting witness by inquiring into the latter's character prior to five
years before, when witness had been convicted for illegally manufacturing whisky;
held, too remote unless brought into case by party who offered witness); see also
3 JoNEs, op. cit. note 7, supra, § 859a.
[Vol. 20
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acter evidence for periods of one and one-half, three, and six years
prior to the trial has been admitted and upheld, while testimony relating
to periods three, four, five, seven, and fifteen years beforehand was too
remote to be of value in indicating present character. 18 The more positive
and better view, and undoubtedly the one in vogue today, is to leave
the matter to the discretion of the trial court, which sees and considers
the probative value of all circumstances. This rule was asserted in so
many words for the first time by Cox, P. J., in the leading case of
Baillie v. Hudson,19 an action on a promissory note begun in 1923, the
defense being payment, and defendant complaining of impeaching testi-
mony of his bad reputation for the ten years prior to the trial: held, the
question as to how far back from the time of trial a party may be permit-
ted to show general reputation of a witness is largely in the discretion
of the trial court. This view was upheld in one of Ellison's classic opin-
ions, State v. Scott,2 0 a prosecution for attempted robbery of the winner
of a crap game by some of the losers. Defendant excepted to impeaching
testimony against him as a witness. It was held that whether the im-
peaching testimony as to a witness' character should be confined only to
character at the exact time of the trial is in the trial court's discretion.
Thus, some leeway is allowed, but no exact standards have been set.
Probably none should be, for an arbitrary statement that only character
within x days, months, or years is to be admitted would evade all special
circumstances which, like the bad penny, always continue to arise. Nor
should prior character be excluded altogether, for one may have been
of extremely poor character several years ago and reformed since. A
prevaricating child more often than not becomes a truthful adult, and
a truthful man of middle age may become a veritable Baron Munchausen
in old age, particularly along certain lines. It is better to let sleeping
dogs lie in this now-settled question of prior character, for Missouri's rule
appears sound.
18. See cases in note 17, supra.
19. 278 S.W. 1056 (Mo. App. 1926).
20. 332 Mo. 255, 58 S.W.2d 275, 90 ALR. 860 (1933); an example of this exercise
of discretion is afforded by State v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 56 S.W. 907 (1900), involving
a prosecution for murder, defendant being convicted of killing one C, an old man
with whom he and his wife had formerly resided, who threatened to prosecute de-
fendant for larceny because of $75 missing when they moved away; held, impeaching
testimony of witness by sheriff who had known him for nine years down to the time
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It would seem almost trite to state that character evidence offered
must be of the individual alone and not his family, but at least two cases 21
have enunciated this doctrine, apparent even to an imprudent man.
Excluding any and all academic theories of the psychology of individual
differences, there is no doubt whatever that one can impeach a witness
only by the witness' personal character, as manifested by reputation, and
not by reference to his family's reputation.
Another special item of character testimony is that the impeaching
witness need not have a personal acquaintance of long standing with the
person impeached. This is illustrated quite well by Rohling, C., in Arnold
v. Alton R.R.,22 an action for personal injuries by one of defendant's
firemen, glass having embedded itself in his face and eye when a window
in the locomotive cab shattered. One N., an attorney for a labor organi-
zation, had made several trips to plaintiff's home and the vicinity to
develop an acquaintance with him during the course of litigation against
the union by plaintiff, who excepted to impeaching testimony as to his
reputation for truth and veracity given by the attorney in this action.
The court held that while ordinarily the impeaching witness resides in
the impeached witness' neighborhood, the testimonial qualification of
such impeaching witness revolves around his knowledge of the party's
general reputation, and that is dependent on the means and extent of
his information rather than on his place of residence. Though no cases
were discovered which directly involved special investigations for the
purpose of gaining information with which to discredit a witness, this one
obviously opened the door to that avenue. The absence of "hatchet man"
cases is a wholesome sign, but it would be a wise move to greatly restrict
the testimony-offered by "impeaching special investigators" by means
of careful instructions to the jury as to the doubtful value of second-hand
21. State v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 241 (1853) (Attempted rape: Negro slave convicted
of attempted rape of white girl; held bad character of parents of prosecutrix in-
admissible to impeach her); State v. Irvin, 324 Mo. 217, 22 S.W.2d 772 (1929) (Larceny
of poultry, defendant complaining of testimony that reputation of his entire family
for honesty and fair dealing was bad; held, in prosecution of five members of same
family for stealing chickens the state could not prove defendant's reputation bad
by proving the entire family's reputation was bad, for such bad reputation must be
proved individually).
22. 343 Mo. 1049, 124 S.W.2d 1092 (1938); see also State v. Higgs, 259 S.W. 454
(Mo. 1924) (Robbery: defendant, convicted of hijacking bank messenger for $20,000,
excepted to impeaching testimony against one of his witnesses, contending that
impeaching witness was not acquainted with person impeached; held, mere lack of
acquaintance of impeaching witness with party impeached does not preclude him
from testifying as to such person's general reputation).
[Vol. 20
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knowledge gained on short duration of time. This would forestall a rash
of totally undesirable evidence, and it seems to be a common occurrence
that more people hunt for dirt than for soap when dollar bills are in-
volved.
What happens when a person's character is never the subject of
community discussion? This unusual aspect was decided early by Sher-
wood, C. J., in the trenchant English for which his opinions are famed:
"A blameless life, oftentimes, though not always, gives origin to such a
good reputation." 23 An imposing array of cases substantiates this thought,
which is in keeping with the basic presumption that the character of any
witness is good until attacked. It is also plain "horse sense" that a person
whose reputation is absent of derogatory discussion enjoys a good reputa-
tion or has evolved a hitherto obscured method of clouding the commu-
nity mind with an infantile Dorian Gray conception of his character.
The latter has certainly not been revealed as yet to men of ordinary
prudence, either in this jurisdiction or any other.
II. Cross-Examination to Question Character
The elementary concept that a witness may be cross-examined as to
anything relevant was established early in Missouri, with little or no
23. State v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22 (1878) (Manslaughter: convicted defendant excepts
to exclusion of testimony as to his good character by witnesses who had "never
heard anything against him"; held, a witness who is well acquainted with a person
whose character is in question, and lives in his neighborhood, will be allowed to
testify as to his general reputation although he may never have heard it discussed
or questioned); State v. Brandenburg, 118 Mo. 181, 23 S.W. 1080 (1893) (Seduction:
defendant, convicted of gaining personal access to previously chaste female on
promise of marriage, complains of testimony as to her good character; held, testi-
mony, that witness has never heard anything bad against prosecutrix's character is
competent evidence of her character, and he need not base his knowledge on what is
"generally said" about her, but may base it upon the absence of discussion of her
character); State v. Day, 188 Mo. 359, 87 S.W. 465 (1905) (Debauching female between
ages prohibited by statute: defendant convicted of having carnal knowledge of
previously chaste female between 14 and 18 years of age; held, a witness who had
heard but one person speak of another's character was not competent to testify as
character witness); State v. Reed, 250 Mo. 379, 157 S.W. 316 (1913) (Murder: Dying
declaration of drinking partner whom defendant killed, thinking deceased was trying
to rob him, admitted in evidence, defendant excepting to testimony as to deceased's
good character; held, mere negative evidence that the neighbors of a witness whose
reputation is in issue, have not heard anything derogatory of his character is ad-
missible in corroboration of his testimony); State v. Pool, 314 Mo. 673, 285 S.W. 726
(1926) (Assault with intent to kill: defendant, a deputy sheriff, convicted for
having struck one S with an iron bar, excepted to negative evidence of prosecuting
witness' good character; held, permitting a witness to testify that he did not know
the prosecuting witness' general reputation because he had never heard it discussed
or attacked, was not error).
1955]
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question raised about it since, even when an impeaching witness cannot
define the terms of the qualities he seeks to impeach.2 4 It is competent
to inquire as to the state of the witness' feelings toward the parties,25
and it is proper for the jury to learn some of the witness' personal history
to aid it in evaluating his testimony.2 6 The limits on this are, of course,
a matter for the trial court's discretion.
Although the sounder rule of auxiliary policy would appear to pro-
hibit irrelevant questions asked a witness on cross-examination for the
purpose of impeaching him, when such questions involve answers dis-
graceful to the witness, the majority rule in the United States is contra.2 7
Missouri follows the majority rule, leaving the expunging of possible
abuses to the trial court's discretion. The original rule was established
in 1880 by Hough, J., in the oft-quoted case of Muller v. The St. Louis
Hospital Association, 28 a suit by the brothers and sisters of a testator
to contest the validity of a will making defendant association residuary
legatee. The court held that on cross-examination a witness may be
compelled to answer any questions which tend to test his credibility or
to shake his credit by injuring his character, however irrelevant to the
facts in issue, or however disgraceful the answer may be to himself,
except where the answer would expose him to a criminal charge. This
24. Page v. Kankey, 6 Mo. 433 (1840) (Assumpsit: held, if a witness is sworn
and gives some evidence, however formal or unimportant, he may be cross-examined
in relation to all matters involved in the issue). To the same effect are: Brown v.
Burrus, 8 Mo. 26 (1843) (Trespass for taking away a slave girl); St. Louis & Iron
Mountain RE. v. Silver, 56 Mo. 265 (1874) (Action on account stated); State v.
Brady, 87 Mo. 142 (1885) (Prosecution for murder); Siegel v. Ilinois Central R.R.,
186 Mo. App. 645, 172 S.W. 420 (1915) (Action for personal injuries; testimony of
witness as to bad reputation of another witness for truth and veracity; weight of
testimony properly left to jury).
25. State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 (1880) (Murder: convicted defendant complained
of exclusion of testimony impeaching one Mrs. L., the only eye-witness to the
stabbing; held, for purpose of impeaching a witness' testimony, it is competent to
inquire as to the state of her feelings toward the parties); Wills v. Sullivan, 211 Mo.
App. 318, 242 S.W. 180 (1922) (Action for damages for assault, orphan placed in home
seeking recovery for foster-mother's brutality; held, ill-feeling of defendant and
witnesses who testified against her is admissible to show bias and as bearing on the
credibility of testimony, but details of trouble or unfriendliness cannot be shown).
26. Avery v. Fitzgerald, 94 Mo. 207, 7 S.W. 6 (1887) (Ejectinent: parties claiming
for same grantor, defendant further claiming through unsatisfied deed of trust, and
excepting to permission granted plaintiff to state as an introduction to his testimony
that he had been a slave in Mississippi before the Civil War; held, it is proper for
the jury to know who the witness is, where from, and such personal matters as will
enable it to appreciate his character and estimate the value of testimony he is about
to give).
27. 3 Wiunop, op. cit., §§ 984 and 987, par. C.
28. 73 Mo. 242 (1880), affirming 5 Mo. App. 390 (1878).
[Vol. 20
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has been repeated and repeated in case after case until there is no doubt
that it is the rule in Missouri, despite the absence of common decency.29
This bitter pill for the perspiring witness being cross-examined is sugar-
coated, however, for, though he may be asked the irrelevant and dis-
graceful questions, the examiner is concluded by his answers. The
qualification to the general rule was enunciated in two leading cases,
Miller v. Journal Company,"° and Wendling v. Bowden.81 The Miller
case was an action for a libel published in the Kansas City Journal that
plaintiff was a "pal" of one "Toots" Rambo, a man of notoriously bad
reputation. Plaintiff excepted to certain questions asked him on cross-
examination as to his alleged improper conduct in his marital relations
and a prior divorce granted his wife. It was held that where a plaintiff
in a civil suit testifies in his own behalf he is subject to impeachment as
any other witness and, therefore, may be questioned as to the particulars
concerning the divorce obtained by his wife, subject to the qualifications
that (1) the examiner is bound by his answers, and (2) he may not be
asked as to what acts he has been charged with since, such questions
tend to affect his character.
The Wendling case, entrenching the holding, was a suit to contest
the validity of a will, the petition alleging undue influence. Held, a party
29. State v. Davis, 284 Mo. 695, 225 S.W. 707 (1920) (Murder: draft-age defendant
convicted of shooting to death draft board member at whom he was irked because
of supposed malicious changing of defendant's draft classification to "immediately
available" status; held, proper to show that deceased's daughter, who was principal
state's witness, had a child born to her before marriage, such being offered to
impeach her credibility); Brendel v. Union Electric Light & Power Company, 252
S.W. 635 (Mo. 1923) (Action for personal injuries by employee hurt by exploding
water heater; held, proper to ask plaintiff on cross-examination as to whether he had
charged fellow-employees 40% interest on personal loans made to them); State v.
Blocker, 278 S.W. 1014 (Mo. 1925) (Unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor; held, witness
may be asked on cross-examination if he is living with a woman not his lawful
wife); Taylor v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, 285 S.W. 1012 (Mo. App. 1926),
noted in 27 CoL. L. REV. 223 (1927) and 61 Am. L. REv. 273 (1927) (Action on fire
insurance policy: plaintiff's household goods were totally destroyed by fire, defense
being that he had connived at or participated in the burning; held, proper to ask
plaintiff's wife on cross-examination whether she had slept with certain other man
during time she was married to plaintiff); McCarthy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 90 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. App. 1936) (Action on life insurance policy by mother
of deceased, defendant having paid proceeds to decedent's estranged wife who was
administratrix; held, proper to inquire of female witness with whom deceased had
been keeping company and in whose apartment he died, as to presence in apartment
of an ex-convict whose presence caused the scuffle resulting in the death); State v.
Perkins, 342 Mo. 560, 116 S.W.2d 80 (1938) (Poultry larceny: held, proper to cross-
examine poultry dealer who was state's witness and who made no claim of privilege,
as to whether he had knowingly received or concealed stolen chickens).
30. 246 Mo. 722, 152 S.W. 40, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 679 (1912).
31. 252 Mo. 647, 161 S.W. 774 (1913).
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who testifies for himself, subjects himself to all the rules as to cross-
examination and impeachment of witnesses, and he may be cross-
examined on the details of his life affecting his character not exposing
him to a criminal prosecution, but unless the details are material to the
issues, the answers are conclusive. Subsequent cases have further
cemented the modifying doctrine, and a witness today, although knowing
he may be asked embarrassing questions, knows also that the details of
red-faced past experiences may remain forever locked in his memory
unless they are vitally material to the issues.3 2 Still a further limitation
is that the witness asked the question is the sole judge of whether the
answer would expose him to a criminal prosecution.83 This subject
32. Cantrell v. Davidson, 180 Mo. App. 410, 168 S.W. 271 (1914) (Action on
promissory note: plaintiff, a former bank cashier, was forced to pay defendant's note
which the bank deemed not good, defendant excepting to the exclusion of his attempt
to show that plaintiff had embezzled bank funds; held, a cross-examination to test
the credibility of a witness by injuring his character cannot be so extended as to
expose him to a criminal charge); State v. Blocker, note 29, supra (Examiner
bound by witness' answer); State ex rel. Horton v. Clark, 320 Mo. 1190, 9 S.W.2d
635 (1928) (Certiorari to compel defendant and other members of State Board of
Health to restore relator's license to practice medicine, which had been revoked
because of alleged fraudulent school records furnished the board in his original
application; held, though a witness may be compelled to testify as to whether he
committed some particular wrong or immoral act, subject to his personal privilege,
those asking the question are concluded by his answer except as to a conviction of
crime); State v. Perkins, note 29, supra (held, party asking question is bound by
witness' answer); Smith v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 502, 142 S.W.2d 70 (1940) (Action for
personal injuries, minor plaintiff who sues by next friend having been injured when
a stock truck in which he was riding was struck by a Missouri Pacific train, defend-
ant being trustee of the railroad; defendant complains of limitation of cross-examin-
ing plaintiff's witness F; held, on cross-examination, discrediting questions concern-
ing whether witness has been previously convicted of or charged with crime may
be asked to impeach him, but party is bound by witness' answer); State v. Hayes,
356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d 723 (1947) (Statutory rape: defendant, convicted of having
carnal intercourse with nine-year old younger sister of girl he was dating, cited as
error question state asked his landlady, who appeared as his witness, as to whether
he had brought women to his room in the past, the question being answered affirma-
tively. The state contended this benefited defendant, since it showed his taste was
for grown women and not young girls; held, the state may ask a witness for defend-
ant discrediting questions or impeach him, even by proof of specific acts of mis-
conduct, if the proof reflects upon the witness, but it is bound by his answers regard-
ing purely collateral matters); State v. Wilson, 361 Mo. 78, 233 S.W.2d 686 (1950)
(Sodomy: defendant, a practicing physician, was convicted of having penetrated the
anus of an eleven-year old boy with his sexual organ, the act being forcible, although
the boy, who had occasionally cleaned up defendant's office, made no outcry.
Defendant excepted to questions asked his former wife, who testified as his witness,
as to whether unnatural sexual relations had been the cause of their divorce, she
answering negatively; held, the state was properly permitted to cross-examine her
on this subject, where she had testified their sexual relations had been proper, but
was concluded by her answer).
33. Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120, 22 Am. Dec. 449 (1829) (Proceeding for superseadas,
petitioner having been jailed for refusing to answer grand jury question as to whom
the bettors were at a faro table, without naming himself; held, the witness is not
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borders largely on a witness' privilege, a topic sufficiently broad within
itself to deserve individual treatment elsewhere, and is, consequently,
without the scope of this investigation.
An old rule34 allowed the jury to consider a witness' refusal to
answer a degrading question when it asserted its verdict, but this has
long since been superseded. The entire matter of allowing, disallowing,
or limiting the line of questioning as to irrelevant and/or degrading
questions is now within the discretion of the trial court, which, under
the present law, is as it should be. This principle was first expounded
in Ring v. Jamison,3 5 an action to recover moneys advanced to defendant's
intestate, defendant administrator asking a witness whether he had been
arrested for larceny; held: counsel may sometimes ask a witness a
question, the answer to which may degrade him, but it is in the discre-
tion of the [trial] court to require an answer; the court may also, under
certain circumstances, forbid such questions to be asked. A long suc-
cession of cases has affirmed and solidified the rule,36 probably the most
bound to answer when his answer may disclose a fact which forms a necessary and
essential link in the chain of testimony, sufficient to convict him of crime-and of
this he is to judge); State v. Miller, 22 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1929) (Larceny of automo-
bile, victim being in church at time of theft, defendant citing as error the exclusion
of a question he sought to ask a state's witness as to whether she and man to whose
room she would slip at night to sleep with, had stolen a car prior; held, exclusion of
question was proper, since the witness could have refused to answer on ground of
incrimination, and defendant had no legal right to have the question answered).
34. Clementine v. State, note 12, supra (Witnesses who had frequented the
house of ill repute had refused to answer questions as to the conduct of inmates and
"customers" while there).
35. 66 Mo. 424 (1877), reversing 2 Mo. App. 584 (1876).
36. Brown v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R., 66 Mo. 588 (1877) (Action for personal
injuries by revenue passenger on freight train, plaintiff excepting to evidence of his
general reputation; held, when a witness has testifieed that the character of another
witness for truth and veracity is bad, it is discretionary with the trial court to admit
or reject further testimony from the same witness to prove his general moral char-
acter also to be bad); Goins v. City of Moberly, 127 Mo. 116, 29 S.W. 985 (1895)
(Action for personal injuries by child who fell on defective sidewalk, defendant city
being refused its attempted impeachment of plaintiffs witness M, by showing he had
maintained his wife as "kept woman" prior to their marriage; held, the court may,
in its discretion, refuse to compel a witness to answer questions concerning his
relations with his wife prior to their marriage, for the purpose of discrediting his
testimony); DeArman v. Taggart, 65 Mo. App. 82 (1896) (Action on promissory note
purportedly executed to U, plaintiff's assignor, defendant inquiring of Mrs. U as to
the date of her marriage, age of her first child, etc., to show that she had illicit
intercourse with her husband prior to their marriage; held, while on cross-examina-
tion it may be right to fix the present character and moral principles of a witness,
yet the interests of justice do not require that errors long since repented of and
forgiven by the community should be recalled and perpetuated in judicial docu-
ments); S. Hirsch & Co. v. Green, 83 Mo. App. 486 (1900) (Action on promissory note,
the court sustaining defendant's objection to a question asked his witness H, a former
employee of plaintiff, as to whether he had been discharged for dishonesty; held,
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recent being Gildehaus v. Jones,37 an action for personal injuries incurred
when plaintiff's automobile was in collision with defendant's tractor-
trailer truck. Plaintiff contended on appeal that it was error to allow
cross-examination concerning her number of marriages. It was held that
the right of cross-examination to a limited degree extends to collateral
matters, including questions which, when answered, may tend to degrade
the witness and affect his credibility, but the extent of such examination
rests largely within the trial courts' discretion; and if the number of
the extent to which a cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting the witness
may go rests entirely in the trial court and will not be interfered with save in case
of manifest abuse, and refusal to allow a witness to answer the question as to his
discharge for dishonesty is not reversible error, since the question is too indefinite);
Edger v. Kupper, 110 Mo. App. 280, 85 S.W. 949 (1905) (Action for breach of contract
of employment of female plaintiff as defendant's hotel manager; held, the trial court
properly excluded evidence of plaintiff's being a "double grass widow"); Cantrell
v. Davidson, note 32, supra (Extent of cross-examination to test credibility is within
the discretion of the trial court); State v. Kinkelkamp, 207 S.W. 770 (Mo. 1918)
(Manslaughter: midwife, convicted for death of fetus, sought to impeach prosecuting
witness through one S, the author of all the trouble, by showing that her mother
knew of the proposed abortion; held, testimony to affect the credibility of a witness
in a criminal case is admissible only as to matters material and relevant to the
issue); State v. Cook, 318 Mo. 1233, 3 S.W.2d 365 (1928) (Prosecution for unlawful
sale of corn whisky, defendant repeatedly obtaining negative answers to questions
asked prosecuting witness as to latter's reputed acts of criminality or moral turpitude;
held, the court did not abuse discretion by ruling against continuance of this type of
examination); State v. Sherry, 64 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1933) (Felonious assault; defendant,
convicted of knifing one R at a dance, complains of admission of the state's question
asked his witness B regarding latter's illegal sale of liquor; held, admissibility of
specific acts to impeach witness' testimony, if not too remote in time, rests largely
in the trial court's discretion); State v. McGee, 336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98 (1935)
(Kidnaping: defendant, convicted of kidnaping for ransom, the daughter of Judge
Mc, sought to impeach him by questions as to an article he had written concerning
slot machine operations and to his interest in such; held, although a witness can be
cross-examined on irrelevant matters to affect his credibility, when such matters do
not expose him to a criminal charge, the trial court in its discretion may refuse to
permit cross-examination on collateral matters which have no direct bearing upon
or tend to prove or disprove a vital issue of the witness' attitude upon the merits
of the case or toward the defendant); State v. Crow, 337 Mo. 397, 84 S.W.2d 926 (1935)
(Larceny of cattle: convicted defendant's questioning of state's witness L as to
whether L had once burned a schoolhouse, excluded; held, any witness may be
impeached by his own evidence and, hence, may be cross-examined for that purpose,
but the extent to which such cross-examination may go is within trial court's dis-
cretion); Hungate v. Hudson, 353 Mo. 944, 185 S.W.2d 646, 157 A.L.R. 598 (1945)
(Action for personal injuries incurred by defendant's truck plowing into the rear
of plaintiff's automobile as he was stopped at a railroad crossing; defendant was
permitted to ask plaintiff why he had not brought the action in Illinois, where he
was a well-known resident; held, although it is proper to identify a witness and to
inquire into his residence, antecedents, social connection, and occupation, and may
be asked questions, the answers to which tend to degrade him or reflect on his
credibility, if cross-examination questions are wholly immaterial and can have no
effect other than their general tendency to prejudice the jury against the witness or
party, they are improper).
37. 356 Mo. 8, 200 S.W.2d 523 (1947).
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marriages of a party is foreign to any issue, cross-examination relating
thereto for purpose of impeachment is properly denied.
One item of cross-examination as to character in which Missouri
definitely differs from the majority rule is its refusal to permit the im-
peaching witness to be asked whether he would believe the impeached
witness if the latter were under oath.38 One early case held that the
question was improper, since the bad character of a witness need not
be confined to the single fact of want of veracity under oath,3 9 but this
was expanded later to admit the asking of the question without hesita-
tion. The inflating case was that of State v. Rothschild,40 involving a
grand larceny conviction of a defendant who pursued the esteemed oc-
cupation of bartender in a house of ill repute, the subject matter being a
billfold dropped by a drunken patron of the establishment, who did not
report the loss at first because he was uncertain as to which of several
similar institutions was the locus in quo of the missing money-holder.
Two of defendant's witnesses were positive in their statements that they
would not believe state's witness S., a pimp, if he were under oath, but
the court refused to allow a third witness to do so, holding that, though
the question was proper, the witness had been fully impeached.
Although not directly saying so, Missouri forsook the majority rule,
as accessioned by the Rothschild case and joined the minority in State v.
Rush,41 an epic authority, which started with an indictment for selling
liquor on Sunday, wherein defendant's impeaching witness was not
permitted to answer whether he would believe the prosecuting witness
under oath, for such would be "an opinion based on his personal knowl-
edge" as well as upon knowledge of general character.42 This same point
of view was taken by the federal court two generations later in Colbeck
v. United States,43 where defendants were prosecuted for theft of mail
pouches containing securities of great value. It was held that an inquiry
into the reputation of an impeached witness for honesty and veracity
was too broad a basis for inquiry as to whether the impeaching witness
38. 3 JoNES, op. cit., note 7, supra, § 862.
39. Day v. State, 13 Mo. 423 (1850) (Grand larceny, state's impeaching witness
stating that reputation of witness M was so bad he would not believe her under oath,
but defendant was not allowed to ask as to how the impeaching witness' opinion was
formed).
40. 68 Mo. 52 (1878), reversing 5 Mo. App. 411 (1878).
41. 77 Mo. 519 (1883).
42. See the scholarly analysis of this point by Wilkins, op. cit., note 2, supra.
43. 14 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1926).
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would believe him under oath. The entire matter stands that way today:
an impeaching witness still cannot be asked the verboten inquiry; albeit,
the arguments, like the normal city streets, run in both directions. 44
The majority rule appears to be the better rule, for, like college football,
it is better to admit at least semiprofessionalism and condone it under
a cultural vision than to act an ostrich. It cannot be reiterated too often
that a witness' idea of community opinion is what he makes it, cross-
examination or no. Elasticity of the rule against personal opinion should
be tested if we are to admit finally that no law can change the nature
of human nature. Neither cajolery nor force can accomplish any change
in the human mind which the mind will not allow. Why, then, should
a set of rules beat its collective head against a stone wall? Under proper
instructions to the jury, would it hurt one any more to have another say
that he would not believe him under oath than it would to have such
other say that he is known in the community, as I interpret it, as being
a chronic liar, cheat, and shady character? With the swing to the major-
ity truth-veracity rule of confining impeaching character evidence, it
would appear that Missouri can go one step farther along the road and
join the majority by eliminating the "whisky case" rule against evidence
as to veracity under oath.
A final aspect of cross-examination to question character should
deal with the extent to which the testimony of an impeached witness is
admissible. There is no doubt whatever that it should not be excluded,
for any spark of a sense of justice acknowledges the fact that one can be
the victim of a "ganging up", and all Missouri decisions in point dis-
covered agreed that the testimony of an impeached witness should be
weighed by the jury in connection with all the facts and circumstances
involved.45 Fair play could dictate no other course.
44. Wilkins, op. cit., note 2, supra, favors admitting the question, in view of the
modern trend toward elimination of the rule against opinion; Cf. Note, 22 ILL. L. REV.
681 (1928), commenting on People v. Lehner, 157 N.E. 211 (Ill. 1927).
45. John Farwell & Co. v. Meyer & Wolff, 67 Mo. App. 566 (1896) (Suit to
rescind mortgages in fraud of creditors; held, it was error to disregard the testimony
of a witness impeached as to general reputation for veracity, for such evidence must
be weighed in connection with surrounding circumstances, to determine to what
extent the witness should be credited); State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1, 46 S.W. 609 (1898)
(Murder; held, the testimony of a material witness will not be rejected, though
his general reputation for truth is impeached, when he occupies an independent, dis-
interested position between the parties and his evidence corresponds and is consis-
tent with the controlling facts of the case); Whetsel v. Forgey, 823 Mo. 681, 20 S.W.2d
523, 67 A.L.R. 476 (1929) (Suit to reform deed of trust and foreclose reformed deed
of trust; held, testimony of impeached witness is entitled to pro rata weight with
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HI. THE DEFENDANT AS WITNESS IN CRIiVINAL PROSECUTION
No oriental hue is cast, but a defendant in a criminal prosecution
immediately becomes a Siamese twin when he enters the witness stand,
occupying the dual role of, properly enough, defendant and witness. As
the first, he is unimpeachable for character unless he chooses to place it in
issue; as the second, he is no different from any other witness, no differ-
ent than if he were an impartial stranger to the entire proceeding. The
reign of jurisprudential confusion is not only apparent from the outset,
but has been all too actual throughout our legal history-and we are by
no means individual in that confusion. The primary question is still
where to draw the line, a question which, in 1955, still has no clear-cut
tabs.
That a defendant in a criminal prosecution can be impeached as a
witness, just as any other witness, was settled three-quarters of a century
ago in State v. Clinton.46 A long line of cases since then have concreted
the rule, with the nature of the offense charged having little or nothing to
do with the permissibility of impeachment.47 Since 193548 the impeaching
other testimony and surrounding circumstances); State v. Miller, note 33, supra
(Credibility of witnesses, one of whom was a confessed thief and one a woman who
slipped up to his room at night to sleep with him, while rooming in the same house,
was jury question) State v. Cohen, 100 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. 1946) (Receiving stolen
goods: junk yard proprietor convicted on testimony of self-confessed thieves; held,
the fact that the three state's witnesses were self-confessed thieves and were other-
wise impeached, did not require Supreme Court, on appeal from conviction of know-
ingly purchasing stolen railroad equipment, to disregard their testimony in determin-
ing sufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction); State v. Thursby, 245 S.W.2d 859
(Mo. 1952) (Prosecution for receiving money without consideration from earnings
of prostitute: defendant, a hotel bellboy, received $4 from the $10 earned by pro-
stitute from "date" he arranged through the procurer, M, who pleaded guilty under
the same statute; held, the fact that the state's witnesses were the prostitue and her
pimp and that the latter had been convicted of felonies, was living in adultery with
her, and had pleaded guilty to similar offense, did not affect the competency of the
witnesses nor destroy the substantiality of their testimony, but only made the
question of credibility one for the jury).
46. 67 Mo. 380, 29 Am. Rep. 506 (1878) (Forgery of promissory note to self
purportedly executed by wealthy deceased).
47. State v. Cox, 67 Mo. 392 (1878) (Larceny of harness); State v. Rugan, 68 Mo.
214 (1878), affirming 5 Mo. App. 592 (Assault with intent to kill); State v. Palmer,
88 Mo. 568 (1886) (Murder); State v. Bulla, 89 Mo. 595, 1 S.W. 764 (1886) (Receiving
stolen horse); State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S.W. 825 (1886), 95 Mo. 474, 8 S.W. 723
(1888) (Murder); State v. Beaty, 25 Mo. App. 214 (1887) (Petit larceny); State v.
Beaucleigh, 92 Mo. 490, 4 S.W. 666 (1887) (Fraudulently obtaining funds by means
of bogus check); State v. Day, 100 Mo. 242, 12 S.W. 365 (1889) (Perjury); State v.
Weeden, 133 Mo. 70, 34 S.W. 473 (1896) (Assault with intent to kill); State v. Dyer,
139 Mo. 199, 40 S.W. 768 (1897) (Murder); State v. McLain, 92 Mo. App. 456 (1902)
(Malicious destruction of personal property caused by placing pieces of iron in wheat
field so as to sabotage neighbor's threshing machine); State v. Woodward, 191 Mo.
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evidence can no longer extend to general morality, but must be confined
to evidence as to his general reputation for truth and veracity.49 Due
to the fact that the defendant is being impeached as a witness and not
as a defendant he does not need to introduce evidence of his good char-
617, 90 S.W. 90 (1905) (Murder of pool hall proprietor); State v. Barnett, 203 Mo. 640,
102 S.W. 506 (1907) (Murder of town marshal during attempted arrest for peace
disturbance); State v. Baker, 209 Mo. 444, 108 S.W. 6 (1908) (Murder of promoter
at Negro picnic); State v. Priest, 215 Mo. 1, 114 S.W. 949 (1908) (Assault with intent
to kill); State v. Hubbard, 223 Mo. 80, 122 S.W. 694 (1909) (Larceny by woman pick-
pocket whose attentions had excited prosecuting witness); State v. Snider, 151 Mo.
App. 699, 132 S.W. 299 (1910) (Illegal sale of liquor); State v. Wilson, 152 Mo: App.
61, 132 S.W. 303 (1910) (Same); State v. Barrett, 240 Mo. 161, 144 S.W. 485 (1912)(Murder following drinking bout); State v. Philpott, 242 Mo. 504, 146 S.W. 1160 (1912)
(Murder following argument about bottle of whisky and price of a soupbone); State
v. Chinn, 164 Mo. App. 124, 148 S.W. 146 (1912) (Illegal sale of liquor); State v. Starr,
note 17, supra; State v. Wellman, 253 Mo. 302, 161 S.W. 795 (1913) (Sodomy, defendant
indulging in cunnilingus with prosecutrix after she had refused intercourse); State
v. Fitch, 180 Mo. App. 482, 166 S.W. 639 (1914) (Violation of local option law); State v.
Shuster, 263 Mo. 600, 173 S.W. 1049 (1915) (Murder); State v. Shepherd, 192 S.W. 427(Mo. 1917) (Keeping crap table); State v. Edmundson, 218 S.W. 864 (Mo. 1920)
(Statutory rape, defendant impeachable as witness by evidence of his bad sexual
morality); State v. Wicker, 222 S.W. 1014 (Mo. 1920) (Assault with intent to kill
neighbor following argument over opening of public road); State v. McBridge, 231
S.W. 592 (Mo. 1921) (Larceny of automobile); State v. Barker, 296 Mo. 51, 246 S.W.
909 (1922) (Same); State v. Hulbert, 299 Mo. 572, 253 S.W. 764 (1923) (Murder during
robbery); State v. Lemon, 263 S.W. 186 (Mo. 1924) (Assault with intent to kill
neighbor because of latter standing on accused's land); State v. Ross, 306 Mo. 449,
267 S.W. 853 (1924) (Arson); State v. Shobe, 268 S.W. 81 (Mo. 1924) (Statutory rape:
prosecutrix was married prostitute but under age of consent); State v. Cooper, 271
S.W. 471 (Mo. 1925) (Statutory rape); State v. Henderson, 284 S.W. 799 (Mo. 1926)
(Larceny of outhouse rugs); State v. Hastings, 285 S.W. 89 (Mo. 1926) (Assault with
intent to kill Mexican cook in Negro restaurant who refused to help defendant get
his automobile out of mud where it was mired, defendant then slapping pro-
secuting witness and shooting him in the hip); State v. Bugg, 316 Mo. 581, 292
S.W. 49 (1927) (Bank robbery); State v. Hodges, 295 S.W. 786 (Mo. 1927) (Feloni-
ous assault with deadly weapon resulting from alleged disparaging statements about
defendant made by prosecuting witness); State v. Hedrick, 296 S.W. 152 (Mo. 1927)
(Illegal sale of corn whisky); State v. Gentry, 320 Mo. 389, 8 S.W.2d 20 (1928) (Rape,
sexual orgy occurring); State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928) (Same);
State v. Irvin, note 21, supra; State v. Howard, 324 Mo. 86, 23 S.W.2d 16 (1929)
(Violation of prohibition law); State v. Meeks, 327 Mo. 1209, 39 S.W.2d 765 (1931)
(Burglary); State v. Bundy, 44 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1931) (Murder of husband); State
v. Williams, 335 Mo. 234, 71 S.W.2d 732 (1934) (Robbery, defendant having extorted
money from attempted rapist of daughter, sought more to use in his own defense
in a federal prosecution); State v. Duvall, 76 S.W.2d 1097 (Mo. 1934) (Burglary:
state allowed to impeach defendant-witness as to bad reputation for truth, veracity,
and good character); State v. Carson, 239 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1951) (Indecent
exposure by proprietor of a "health club" who solicited two young female job ap-
plicants to give him a "local"); see also 3 WIGMORE, op. cit., note 6, supra, §§ 890, 891.
48. See sections 5 and 6, infra.
49. State v. Quinn, 345 Mo. 855, 136 S.W.2d 985 (1940) (Burglary of filling
station); State v. Willard, 346 Mo. 773, 142 S.W.2d 1046 (1940) (Larceny of cow);
State v. Ferguson, 353 Mo. 46, 182 S.W.2d 38 (1944) (Murder of husband); State v.
Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46 (1944) (Murder); State v. Sheets, 229 S.W.2d
703 (Mo. App. 1950) (Common assault).
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acter before the state can impeach him,5° but it is a prerequisite that he
must first testify.5 ' His reputation cannot be proved by that of his
family,5 2 and the state may not inquire into special instances of crime
imputed to him,5s although it may comment on his failure to explain
incriminating circumstances testified to by other witnesses. 4
It was formerly the caballero rule that a defendant testifying could
not be cross-examined on matters not referred to by him in his direct
examination,5 5 but this was questioned" and thereafter expressly over-
ruled so as to permit a cross-examination today limited only by the over-
riding discretion of the trial court, privilege, the opinion rule, and the
somewhat watered-down rule against impeachment by particular acts or
facts.57
50. State v. Hulbert, note 47, supra; State v. Cooper, note 47, supra; State v.
Henderson, note 47, supra.
51. State v. Wellman, note 47, supra.
52. State v. Irvin, notes 21 and 47, supra.
53. State v. Beaty, note 47, supra (admitting only evidence of general reputa-
tion); State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S.W. 728 (1888) (Murder of farmer by neighbor
following controversy over fence; held, the state may introduce evidence of a de-
fendant's general moral character to impeach him as a witness, but not alone as to
the trait of character involved in the offense); State v. Archie, 301 Mo. 392, 256 S.W.
803 (1923) (Murder, state precluded from showing defendant's bad reputation for
peace and quietude); State v. Stout, 257 S.W. 186 (Mo. App. 1924) (Violation of
prohibition law, state could not show defendant had bad reputation as moonshiner and
bootlegger); State v. Jones, 221 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1949) (Burglary: prosecutor not
allowed to appeal to jury to convict merely because defendant had committed other
unrelated crimes).
54. State v. Larkin and Harris, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S.W. 600, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 13
(1913) (Murder: defendant and wife of deceased were surprised by latter returning
unexpectedly from work one night, fatal gun battle following; prosecutor was permit-
ted to comment on defendant's failure to deny or explain away statements of other
witnesses that he said he would take care of his paramour if anything happened to
her husband).
55. State v. McGraw, 74 Mo. 573 (1881) (Burglary, defendant asked on cross-
examination as to prior conviction and penitentiary sentence in Kansas under another
name); State v. Porter, 75 Mo. 171 (1881) (Obtaining signature to note under false
pretenses, representing it to be a sales agency contract); State v. McLaughlin, 76 Mo.
320 (1882); State v. Turner, 76 Mo. 350 (1882); State v. Palmer, note 47, supra; State
v. Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129, 1 S.W. 145 (1886) (Forgery: extension of cross-examina-
tion beyond matters referred to in direct examination will justify reversal); State v.
Bulla, note 47, supra; State v. Rider, note 47, supra.
56. State v. Howe, 287 Mo. 1, 228 S.W. 477 (1920) (Receiving money without
consideration from earnings of prostitute, defendant being "madam" of the house of
ill repute where prosecutrix plied her trade; held, asking defendant whether she
had ever been arrested and convicted of crime was not error merely because she
was not questioned as to such on direct examination); State v. McBride, note 47,
supra.
57. State v. Bagby, 338 Mo. 951, 93 S.W.2d 241 (1936) (Bank robbery; cross-
examination as to prior convictions of crime allowed, though not testified to on
direct examination); State v. Shipman, 354 Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273 (1945) (Burglary);
State v. Hacker, 214 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1948), noted in 14 Mo. L. REV. 172 (1949)
(Assault with intent to kill).
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Probably the most exaggerated form of hearsay permissible in
criminal prosecutions in Missouri or elsewhere is the subtle defendant-
impeachment afforded by permitting the state to ask his character wit-
nesses if they have ever heard rumors of his particular acts of misconduct,
especially when such acts have involved criminal conduct, arrests, indict-
ments or informations, and convictions. This is done ostensibly to test
the sources of the witness' knowledge, for reliability, but as it works
out in actual practice, it accomplishes both the direct impeachment of the
witness himself and the indirect impeachment of the defendant as a
defendant in the eyes of the jury. The jury lacks the discerning eye of an
appellate justice and cannot differentiate between the mere discrediting
of the character witness by disintegrating his reliability of sources of
knowledge, and convicting the defendant on the charge at bar because
of disparaging rumors which may be based on fancy as well as fact.
This evil, unjustifiable, unconscionable rule is to be condemned by
anyone possessing a jurisprudential sense of fair play (how can anyone be
presumed to have prepared a defense against rumors?), but it is un-
questionably the law in Missouri today." It has been axiomatic since
ancient days that when the reason for the rule disappears, the rule itself
58. 3 WiGmop, op. cit., note 6, supra, § 988; State v. Crow, 107 Mo. 341, 17 S.W.
745 (1891) (Larceny of cow); State v. Evans, 158 Mo. 589, 59 S.W. 994 (1900) (Murder
of husband resulting from defendant's familiarity with deceased's wife); State v.
Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S.W. 650 (1903) (Murder of son-in-law caused by argument
as to when deceased was going to move away from defendant's home); State v.
Brown, 131 Mo. 192, 79 S.W. 1111 (1904) (Murder of stepdaughter who had called
defendant a "drunken son of a bitch"); State v. Harris, 209 Mo. 423, 108 S.W. 28
(1908) (Assault with intent to kill; asking of question as to rumors held within trial
court's discretion); State v. Phillips, 233 Mo. 299, 135 S.W. 4 (1911) (Assault with
intent to kill a drunk who threw rocks at defendant; rumors as to defendant's
running a "dive" and illegally selling liquor, admitted); State v. Steele, 280 Mo. 63,
217 S.W. 80 (1919) (Abortion: rumors as to defendant's formerly being a drunkard
who had taken the "whisky cure" held, properly admitted); State v. Seay, 282 Mo.
672, 222 S.W. 427 (1920) (Statutory rape: defendant convicted of having relations
with 13-year old girl in presence of another girl, this extending over prolonged
period; rumors as to defendant's being charged with similar crimes in the past held,
properly admitted); State v. Affronti, 292 Mo. 53, 238 S.W. 106 (1922) (Robbery;
rumors as to defendant's having been in police lineups and in reform school,
admitted); State v. Glazebrook, 242 S.W. 928 (Mo. 1922) (Receiving stolen goods);
State v. Cooper, notes 47 and 50, supra; State v. Gurnee, 309 Mo. 6, 274 S.W. 58 (1925)
(Sodomy accomplished by insertion of defendant's sexual organ in anus of son;
rumors of prior misconduct, admitted); State v. Johnson, 316 Mo. 86, 289 S.W. 847
(1926) (Rape of white woman by Negro; rumors of defendant's prior penitentiary
term, admitted); State v. Miller, 12 S.W.2d 39 (1928) (Violation of prohibition law);
State v. Hicks, 64 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1933) (Buying and receiving stolen goods; rumors
of similar crime in the past, admitted); State v. Pope, 338 Mo. 919, 92 S.W.2d 904
(1936) (Robbery; rumors as to other offenses, admitted); State v. Bagby, note 57,
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crumbles away. Can there be any reason for this rule today when char-
acter evidence is confined to truth and veracity? When there is a rule
against hearsay? And a rule against opinion? All the facilities of
common sense discount rumors as statements to be taken with a grain of
salt. The average bank teller, salesman, electrician, and steeplejack,
regardless of his expert knowledge in his chosen field of endeavor, is
not learned in the law. It is he, however, who collectively con-
stitutes the jury which hears a witness testify as to a party's good
character, then hears the witness admit he has heard rumors that
party has done something wrong at one time in his life. le does
not hear the testimony of the party who started the rumor, nor
does he hear repeater 1, repeater 2, repeater 3, nor repeater x, so as
to determine the truth of the rumor: all he hears is a witness' affirmative
answer. Does the juryman then recall that he hears the affirmative
answer purely to test the witness' source of knowledge, or does he in-
stinctively believe the rumor himself and chalk up another black mark
against the defendant on the strength of something, the truth of which
there is no opportunity afforded to prove or disprove because of the
unnecessary time consumed in collateral matters? Must Missouri wait
until a virtual majority of other states refute this archaic rule and an
image of Ellison's intellectual gianthood be born in the law to have like
courage and wisdom to wipe out a rule founded on convenience rather
than on justice? Must we wait legislative action as long in coming as the
statute conforming Missouri to the simple media of uniform traffic hand-
signals (effective August 29, 1953, after a two-decade wait)? Let us
hope not! This inequitable, time worn rule, born probably at the time of
the Spanish Inquisition, should no longer serve to pester erring citizens of
a state located in the heart of an American democracy.
IV. THE MoRAL Ruiz
This section, opportunely, is totally historical, Missouri dividing its
judicial history, as regards the law of character evidence, into two pe-
riods: (1) prehistoric (the Stone Age of the morality rule) and (2) com-
mon sense (the enlightened age of the truth-veracity rule). The light
year, i.e., when Ellison flipped the switch, was 1935. This section, then,
concerns the "grunt", "ug", and "duh" stage prior to 1935.
The morality rule was first established by Napton, J., in the Victorian
1955]
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Era case of State v. Shields,5 9 a prosecution for assault and battery. It
was held that, in discrediting a witness, a party is not restricted to in-
quiries into the character of that witness for veracity; a bad moral char-
acter generally, or a depravity not necessarily allied to a want of truth,
may yet, to some, extent, shake the credibility of a witness and, there-
fore, is a fair subject of investigation. This thought was echoed over
and over again in Missouri's legal annals in the next four generations.00
Although some of the cases do not so indicate,0 ' there were some limita-
tions on the extent of coverage of the term "general morality". Thus,
evidence as to reputation for peace and quietude or violence and turbul-
ence was excluded, 2 as was evidence as to good or bad citizenship.0 3
59. 13 Mo. 236, 53 Am. Dec. 147 (1850).
60. State v. HaInilton, 55 Mo. 520 (1874) (Murder); State v. Breeden, 58 Mo.
507 (1875) (Defiling female ward); State v. Cox, note 47, supra; State v. Grant, 76
Mo. 236 (1882); 79 Mo. 113 (1883) (Murder of policeman attempting to apprehend
thief); State v. Raven, 115 Mo. 419, 22 S.W. 376 (1893) (Murder of paramour by
Negress who found him with another woman and hit him with a brick); State v.
Ragsdale, 59 Mo. App. 590 (1894) (Prosecution of mayor of Moberly for willful and
malicious oppression in office by having two complainants arrested and jailed, then
cursing them); Sitton v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Missouri, 84 Mo. App. 208 (1900)
(Action on life insurance policy; bad reputation for chastity of female witness held
admissible); Wright v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. 678, 86 S.W. 452 (1905) (Action for
personal injuries caused by loose sidewalk board; evidence of bad reputation of
prosecutrix as to chastity held admissible); State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. 281, 91 S.W.
892, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535 (1906) (Murder: held, general bad reputation for morality
cannot be extended to reputation for peace and quiet or turbulence and violence);
York v. City of Everton, 121 Mo. App. 640, 97 S.W. 604 (1906) (Action for personal
injuries suffered on defective sidewalk; prosecutrb:'s bad reputation for chastity held,
properly admissible); State v. Christopher, 134 Mo. App. 6, 114 S.W. 549 (1908)
(Prosecution for illegal sale of liquor; held, proper to show defendant's general busi-
ness reputation was that of a seller of liquor in violation of law); Winn v. Modem
Woodmen of America, 138 Mo. App. 701, 119 S.W. 536 (1909) (Action on insurance
policy, defendant's witness being impeached for getting drunk any time he could get
liquor; held, in impeachment, inquiry may not only concern general moral character,
but also extend to particular traits, such as sobriety); State v. Loesch, 180 S.W. 875
(Mo. 1915) (Prosecution for obtaining deed by false pretenses: defendant's trading
with partner of associates who had had reputations for honesty and fair dealing,
help properly admitted); State v. Huffman, 238 S.W. 430 (Mo. 1922) (Robbery:
testimony that defendant was a bootlegger held, admissible); State v. Hulbert,
notes 47 and 50, supra; State v. Harmon, 317 Mo. 354, 296 S.W. 397 (1927) (Robbery);
State v. De Shon, 334 Mo. 862, 68 S.W.2d 805 (1934) (Robbery by use of deadly
weapon, taking diamond ring from girl who refused defendant's solicitation to
engage in sexual degeneracy, then successfully resisted forcible attempt to rape);
see also 3 WIGmoaE, op. cit., note 6, supra, §§ 923, 924; and Notes, 86 Am. Dec. 668
(1864) and 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 689 (1907).
61. See note 60, supra.
62. State v. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464, 14 S.W. 712 (1890) (Murder); State v. Beckner,
note 60, supra; State v. Richardson, 194 Mo. 326, 92 S.W. 649 (1906) (Murder); State
v. Baird, 271 Mo. 9, 195 S.W. 1010 (1917) (Assault with intent to kill).
63. State v. Ragsdale, note 60, supra; State v. Baird, note 62, supra; State v.
Gant, 33 S.W.2d 970 (Mo. 1930) (Statutory rape of stepdaughter); State v. Shepard,
334 Mo. 423, 67 S.W. 2d 91 (1933).
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Similarly, it was improper to show that a witness was impulsive and used
profanity liberally.6 4 Nor was it proper to show that he was in the tavern
business, for purposes of discrediting him.a5
The basic trouble with the morality rule was its evasion of the
cardinal purpose of all evidence: to arrive at the truth. It is simple
logic to presume that, in order to arrive at the truth, impeachment should
be confined to those traits of personality and elements of character (as
manifested by reputation) which have a direct bearing on truth-telling.
To show the asininity of certain aspects of the morality rule, male chastity
was once admitted to impeach, the theory being that an unchaste male
was of bad general character and, hence, not likely to tell the truth, al-
though the idea was originally rejected and later criticized.66 With the
overthrow of the morality rule itself, this puritanic memento that defied
both the experience and wisdom of Solomon was also atomized. A good
riddance it was, too, for a rule of such prudish disregard of all the facts
of world history accomplished only three things: (1) the inflation of the
ego of the impeached witness, (2) the amusement of the court, and (3)
the satisfaction of the curiosity of cross-examining counsel as to how
the "other fellow had fared".
The opening gun fired against the morality rule was probably that of
64. Shaefer v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 98 Mo. App. 445, 72 S.W. 154 (1903) (Action
for damages for assault: plaintiff, a passenger on one of defendant's trains, thought
conductor was taking up more mileage from his ticket than was proper, and on his
so stating, conductor shoved plaintiff back on seat, and porter began choking him);
State v. Baird, note 62, supra.
65. Shaefer v. Missouri Pacific Ry., note 64, supra. This is also true under the
present truth-veracity rule: Thompson v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 S.W.2d 116
(Mo. 1952).
66. State v. Clawson, 30 Mo. App. 139 (1888) (Adultery: defendant openly living
in notorious relationship with wife of male servant; held, male chastity inadmissible);
State v. Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 455 (1891) (Adultery, married man cohabiting with
single woman; male chastity held inadmissible); State v. Shroyer, 104 Mo. 441, 16
S.W. 286, 24 Am. St. Rep. 344 (1891) (Assault with intent to rape, defendant ap-
prehended in act of taking off trousers in 14-year old girl's room where she was
asleep; held, male chastity admissible as part of general character, defendant being
unhurt if general character is unaffected by such reputation for unchastity); State
v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 31 S.W. 1033, 132 Mo. 102, 33 S.W. 167, 53 Am. St. Rep. 477
(1895) (Defiling stepdaughter, defendant engaging in 35 to 40 different acts of
intercourse with her, resulting eventually in pregnancy and discovery by her mother
of what was going on; held, male defendant cannot be discredited for lack of chastity);
State v. Pollard, 174 Mo. 607, 74 S.W. 969 (1903) (Defiling female employee under
age eighteen: male chastity held admissible, but morality rule itself strongly casti-
gated); see also 3 WiaioRE, op. cit., note 6, supra, § 923; also the excellent analysis of
the problem in Note, Impeaching Witness by Proving Want of Chastity, 53 Am. St.
Rep. 479 (1895); and the collection of cases in 65 A.L.R. 410.
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Fox; J., in State v. Pollard,67 in which he approved admission of the male
defendant's bad reputation in the community for chastity and morality,
but stepped in with a body blow against the general rule by stating that
impeachment should be confined to truth and veracity, such constituting
the trait of character directly involved. His analysis further concluded
that the reason for the rule was gone, since both a defendant and a person
previously convicted of a crime were now able to testify.
The next salvo was exploded by Johnson, J., in State v. Oliphant,8
one of the group of "Kansas City whisky cases", defendant druggist hav-
ing been convicted of illegal sale of intoxicants to a detective employed by
the prosecuting attorney. Evidence was admitted that defendant had a
reputation for selling liquor illegally, this showing his general reputation
and thereby impeaching his credibility. The rule was adhered to, but
thoroughly criticized. A similar objection was registered by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals the same year,69 but the status quo remained until 1923,
when the strongest slash hitherto made was wielded by Railey, C., in
State v. Archie,7° wherein he asserted that character impeachment should
be confined to truth and veracity, honesty and fair dealing rather than
general morality.
The chief architect of destruction, Ellison, began to whittle away at
the morality rule in State v. Scott, decided in 1933.71 Although he still
clung to the rule, he opined that State v. Archie was right, but was out of
line with the weight of Missouri authority. His thorough review of past
major cases concluded in a broadside assault on the rule and the absence
of good logic behind it.
The coup de grqce came with Ellison's masterpiece, State v. Wil-
liams,72 referred to as "a landmark in the law of evidence in Missouri".78
The facts are these: defendant, a Negress, was convicted of the murder of
one "Dutch" Jones, a Negro man with whom she had been living for two
67. Note 66, supra.
68. 128 Mo. App. 252, 107 S.W. 32 (1908).
69. In re Imboden's Estate (fmboden v. Union Trust Co.), 128 Mo. App. 555,
107 S.W. 400 (1908) (Claim of purported widow against estate; holding generally
restates principle adopted in State v. Pollard, notes 66 and 67, supra).
70. Note 53, supra.
71. Note 20, supra, at 279-280.
72. 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175, 100 A.L.R. 1503 (1935); noted in 20 rm-. L. Rav.
695 (1936), 1 Mo. L. REv. 181 (1936), and 21 ST. Lous L. REV. 265 (1936); see also 3
JONEs, op. cit., note 7, supra § 860.
73. Wilkins, op. cit., note 2, supra.
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years, the shooting climaxing deceased's going to a dance without
defendant. She followed him, several arguments ensued, and the fatal
shooting occurred. Among the errors alleged was that impeaching evi-
dence as to her general bad moral character was allowed, she contending
that only reputation for truth and veracity could be shown to impeach
her as a witness. This contention was upheld, and Missouri had joined the
majority, upending nearly a century of gross misadventures in the field of
dispensing justice. It was as simple as that: a juridical Moses had led his
flock out of the wilderness.
V. THE TRUTH-VERAcrrY RuLE
This is not a new sign in the zodiac, merely a buffing and polishing
of the more worthwhile part of an old one from which it was extracted.
Evidence of one's bad character, insofar as it concerns truth and veracity,
honesty, and fair dealing have always been admissible to impeach him,74
the only difference between the truth-veracity and morality rules being
that the latter went much further in coverage than the former, including
many traits beside truth and veracity. It might also be worthy of note
that impeachment as to veracity does not mean the witness is incapable
of speaking the truth.75
The true rule, now stated succinctly for the first time, rapidly became
settled law,76 and the standards which it set left no room for argument;
consequently, it is now followed without question."7
74. Kingman & Co. v. Shawley, 61 Mo. App. 54 (1895) (Action on guaranty
contract; held, witness may be impeached by showing his bad reputation for fair
dealing); State v. Loesch, note 60, supra; Williamson v. Mc Elvain, 199 S.W. 567
(Mo. App. 1917) (Action to recover unpaid rents; held, veracity of witness may be
impeached by proving his bad reputation for honesty and fair dealing); Pioneer
Stock Powder Co. v. Goodman, 201 S.W. 576 (Mo. App. 1918) (Action on promissory
notes signed by defendant under assurances of plaintiff's agents that they were mere
sales agency contracts and that he did not need to get his glasses to read them; held,
bad reputation for fair dealing, admissible); Reynolds v. Davis, 303 Mo. 418, 260
S.W. 994 (1924) (Purchaser's action for vendor's fraud in sale of interest in land and
mining lease; held, bad reputation for honesty and fair dealing admissible to im-
peach); Williams v. American Exchange Bank, 222 Mo. App. 483, 280 S.W. 720 (1926)
(Suit to recover excess paid on promissory note, usury alleged; held, any witness
can be impeached by testimony that his reputation for truth and veracity is bad).
75. Scrivner v. American Car & Foundry Co., 330 Mo. 408, 50 S.W.2d 1001 (1932)
(Action on lease of patent).
76. State v. Nibarger, 339 Mo. 937, 98 S.W.2d 625 (1936) (Larceny of harness).
77. State v. Whipkey, 358 Mo. 563, 215 S.W.2d 492 (1948) (Murder: defendant
formerly lived with deceased in California, threatening to kill her if he ever found
her with another man, later carrying out his threat, and complaining of inability to
prove unchastity of female state's witness; held, refusal to permit cross-examination
1955]
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VI. PARTiCULLAR ACTS OR FACTS
In General
It has long been the rule in Missouri that a witness may be impeached
by general evidence of reputation, but not by evidence of particular acts,
this principle having been laid down in 1865 in State v. White,78 a rape
case where defendant was not permitted to prove particular acts of lewd-
ness on the part of the prosecutrix. Although exceptions and deviations
have gradually worked their way in, the general rule still stands virtually
unscathed. It is the majority rule,7 9 the reasons given by the modern
Master being (1) confusion of issues and (2) unfair surprise.80 It is
stated another way by an earlier scholar whose words are oft-quoted.8'
"Then 'The exposing every man who comes into our courts of justice, to
have every action of his life publicly scrutinized, would keep most men
out of them. To admit character evidence in every case, or to reject it in
every case would be equally fatal to justice'." The propriety of this logic
has been recognized in the Missouri courts time after time,8 2 until today
of state's witness concerning conduct which, if admitted, would have tended to dis-
credit her as to chastity, was not error; morality cannot be used to impeach reputa-
tion for truth).
78. 35 Mo. 500 (1865).
79. 3 WIGMORE, op. cit., note 6 supra, § 987.
80. Id., § 979.
81. 1 BEST, EviNmCE § 256 (12th ed. 1922) as quoted in Note, Evidence of Parti-
cular Facts or Particular Transactions, 17 Am. Dec. 77 (1827); see also 58 Ani. Jun.,
Witnesses § 758, and authorities cited there; and 70 C.P., Witnesses, § 1044.
82. Seymour v. Farrell, 51 Mo. 95 (1872) (Action on promissory note by indorsee
after maturity against joint makers, plaintiff seeking to prove specific charges of
immorality against defendant; held, the character of a witness cannot be impeached
by testimony as to specific acts, since the witness is not presumed to be prepared to
repel such attacks); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1891) (Statutory rape,
defendant sought answers of prosecutrix's mother to inquiries as to specific acts of
alleged immorality commencing at a period twenty years previous; held, a witness
cannot be required to testify concerning the immorality of his previous life where
such testimony does not tend directly to prove some issue); State v. Gesell, 124 Mo.
531, 27 S.W. 1101 (1894) (Manslaughter, defendant seeking to impeach female state's
witness by delving into her past life for specific delinquencies; held, evidence of
specific past delinquencies inadmissible to impeach veracity); Wright v. Kansas City,
note 60, supra (Evidence of specific immoral acts of a female is inadmissible to
affect her credibility in an action for personal injuries); State v. Sassaman, 214
Mo. 695, 114 S.W. 590 (1908) (Murder; defendant seeking to show that female witness
had lived in adultery with one B; held, the inquiry in impeachment cannot extend
to evidence of specific acts); State v. Teeter, 239 Mo. 475, 144 S.W. 445 (1912)
(Seduction: female witness impeaching defendant was not permitted to show that
he seduced and impregnated her); State v. Hyder, 258 Mo. 225, 167 S.W. 524 (1914)
(Assault with intent to kill tenant of neighboring farm; refusal of trial court to
permit defendant to prove that prosecuting witness had sworn falsely against him
in another prosecution; held, not error); State v. Burgess, 259 Mo. 383, 168 S.W. 740
(1914) (Rape of mentally deficient girl living with defendant and wife, wife being
[Vol. 20
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even the exceptions do not seem to be expanding, which is the antithesis
of most rules of both substantive and procedural law as time passes.
Not only are specific acts inadmissible to impeach a witness, but the
courts have, on occasion, specified particular acts which cannot be shown.
Thus, the fact that a person has been a bankrupt is not admissible,8 3 for
taking advantage of a right which law gives is not discreditable. Nor may
a holder in due course, in an action on a promissory note, show that the
payee procured it by fraud and theft and that it was not transferred when
alleged, when trying to impeach the payee's character.8 4 Questions per-
taining to the domestic relations of a witness are largely excluded on
grounds of both relevancy and policy, 5 but there have been exceptions.8 6
required to answer on cross-examination that she had heard defendant had engaged
in illicit sexual relations with one E.D. prior to his marriage to her; held, a defendant
in a criminal prosecution cannot be impeached as a witness by proof of specific
immoral acts through a witness who had not testified to his good character); State
v. Lasson, 292 Mo. 155, 238 S.W. 101 (1922) (Payroll robbery, defendant's wife
answering affirmatively on cross-examination that she lived in adultery with him
for two years before they were married, which was seven years prior to the trial;
held, specific acts of immoral conduct by a witness cannot be inquired into for the
purpose of impeaching her credibility, particularly when the misconduct occurred
seven years prior and undisputed evidence showed she had been a good woman
since); Page v. Payne, 293 Mo. 600, 240 S.W. 156 (1922) (Action for personal injuries
brought by switchman against Director General of Railroads during federal control,
several elements of defendant's evidence being excluded; held, offer to prove that
male plaintiff had committed adultery and lived with other men's wives was properly
refused, since the acts were links in a chain which might convict him of crime, which
he could not be made to disclose by his own testimony); Wills v. Sullivan, note 25,
supra (Boy's attempts to break into neighbors' cellars, offered to show he was
incorrigible, were inadmissible in his action against foster mother for assault, since
a witness cannot be impeached by proof of specific acts); State v. Harmon, note 60,
supra (Specific or particular acts of immorality or wrongdoing not allowed to
impeach witness); State v. Zoller, 1 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1927) (Robbery of drug store
which allegedly sold intoxicating liquor, following proprietor's refusal to sell liquor
to defendant; held, proof that prosecuting witness had engaged in unlawful sale of
liquor to general public was properly excluded, since a witness cannot be impeached
by proof of specific or particular acts); Bellovich v. Griese, 100 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1936)
(Action for personal injuries by female occupant of taxi which was struck by de-
fendant's automobile; held, cross-examination of female witness that she and plain-
tiff had been "picked up" by married taxi driver, they thereafter visiting persons
alleged to be gangsters, was improper, since such testimony was irrelevant and
calculated to create an unfavorable impression toward plaintiff); State v. Perkins,
note 29, supra (Witness can be impeached by specific acts only on cross-examina-
tion, not by independent proof of such acts).
83. Shull v. Kallauner, 222 Mo. App. 64, 300 S.W. 554 (1927).
84. Cox v. Higdon, 67 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. App. 1932).
85. Ashford v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 80 Mo. App. 638 (1899) (Action
on life insurance policy by widow beneficiary, defendant attempting to show that
plaintiff and deceased were not married at time of issue of policy; held, it was in-
proper to ask plaintiff whether she had given birth to a child before her marriage);
Edger v. Kupper, note 36, supra; Page v. Payne, note 82, supra (In action by rail-
road employee for injuries, records of divorce proceedings and default judgments
19551
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Probably the most direct case along this line is that of Hancock v. Black-
well,87 an action for slander brought by a female graduate student at the
University of Missouri against a professor at the institution. A quantity
of money was taken from the home of one P while plaintiff was a visitor
in P's household. P turned the matter over to the city marshal, whom
defendant saw on the street one day and voluntarily told him that he
had discussed the matter with P, that he had told P that plaintiff had
taken the money, and that she was, "an adventuress of the first water and
destined to become a noted crook." Over defendant's objection plaintiff
was permitted to show that defendant had threatened to commit his
father-in-law to an asylum if a provision were not made in the father-in-
law's will for defendant's wife. The admission of such cross-examination
was held error.
Any rule, no matter how steadfast, must have its exceptions, and
the rule against impeachment by proof of particular acts or facts is not
an exception to the fact of exceptions to rules. Hence, to impeach a wit-
ness' character it may be shown that he tampered with witnesses at this
and other trials,8 or kept a house of prostitution,89 or prepared fraudu-
against plaintiff by two wives were not competent evidence against plaintiff, because
defendant was not a party to such cases); State v. Nasello, 325 Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d
132 (1930) (Murder of police officer by bandits escaping from robbed bank, defendant
attempting to impeach state's witness on nature of grounds of latter's divorce; held,
exclusion of testimony of state's witness on cross-examination as to his wife's
divorcing him because of his association with lewd women was not error, since
defendant offered no records of divorce petition and decree and therefore lacked
best evidence); Benfield v. Thompson, 139 S.W.2d 1009 (Mo. App. 1940) (Action for
personal injuries by passenger in automobile which overturned when it struck a
place where tracks had been recently removed by the Missouri Pacific Railroad, of
which defendant was trustee, defendant seeking to impeach plaintiff's witness who
was driver of the vehicle; held, it was not error to exclude evidence on cross-examina-
tion that plaintiff had made no appearance in answer to divorce petitions charging
him with immoral conduct as ground for the divorce).
86. Webster v. Boyle-Prior Construction Co., 144 S.W.2d 828 (1940) (Action
under Workmen's Compensation Act for wrongful death of husband, defendant show-
ing plaintiff's unchastity in leaving husband following argument several months
prior to his death, thereafter living in adultery with childhood sweetheart; held, such
evidence was properly admitted because of plaintiff's interest in subject matter).
87. 139 Mo. 441, 44 S.W. 205 (1897).
88. Bates v. Halladay, 31 Mo. App. 162 (1888) (Action for breach of contract of
sale of lumber); Carp v. Queen Insurance Company of America, 104 Mo. App. 502, 79
S.W. 757 (1904) (Action on fire insurance policy); State v. Berkowitz, 325 Mo. 519, 29
S.W.2d 150 (1930) (Arson).
89. State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S.W. 1089 (1893) (Burglary and grand larceny;
held, witness may be asked whether she had not kept girls for the purpose of prosti-
tution, since the state had the right to know her vocation, and what she had been and
was then engaged in, as affecting her credibility); contra: State v. Hungate, 98 S.W.2d
537 (Mo. 1936) (Robbery, defendant seeking to show prosecuting witness was pro-
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lent tax returns, 90 or perjured himself at another trial,91 or engaged in
disreputable transactions, 92 or knew notorious criminals and maintained
a hideout for them,93 had a kept woman,9 4 or got into "scrapes".9 5 Unless
he exercises his privilege he may be cross-examined as to his commission
of a detestable crime. 6 So also may it be shown that lewd women visited
his home when other men and his wife were present and he was absent,
but knew about it.97 Certain other specific acts may be extracted on cross-
examination. When a woman's chastity is slandered and she sues for
damages, the defendant may show her specific acts of fornication, both
to determine her credibility and the truth of the matter asserted.99
Specific habits or traits of character are also properly admitted when
they bear on the witness' credibility. Drug addiction is one of these.
Though but one lone case was found dealing with the problem in MIis-
souri,10 it has received fairly extensive attention elsewhere. 101 In the
prietor of house of ill repute; held, refusal to permit such showing over state's ob-
jection was not error, since the accused had previously elicited from witness that he
was not connected with operation of the house in question).
90. Cogin v. Herman, 202 S.W. 552 (Mo. 1918) (Suit to set aside deeds in fraud
of creditors by one R, defendant being sworn as plaintiff's witness and impeachment
allowed as to prior preparation of false tax and credit statements, tending to show
prevarication).
91. State v. Stogsdill, 324 Mo. 105, 23 S.W.2d 22 (1929) (Murder: held, that
witness corroborating state's principal witness admitted he had perjured himself
at coroner's inquest only affected credibility of his testimony).
92. State v. McLaughlin, notes 8 and 17, supra.
93. State v. Bagby, Notes 57 and 58, supra.
94. State v. Nasello, note 85, supra (Cross-examination of defendant's father as
to whether he lived at a certain place under an assumed name and kept woman
there as his wife was properly admitted to impeach or disparage his testimony).
95. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 254 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1952) (Action for
personal injuries by trespasser who was pushed off moving passenger train by brake-
man, he admitting on direct examination that he had been in "scrapes"; held, proper
to show that there were other "scrapes" in which plaintiff had been involved, of
which he had not related on direct examination).
96. State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 100 S.W. 587 (1907) (Murder of neighbor who
had stoned defendant's pigs, which were constantly entering his yard).
97. McCoy v. Hill, 296 Mo. 135, 246 S.W. 582 (1922) (Alienation of affections of
plaintiff's wife, defendant being town constable; plaintiff testified that no persons
of bad repute ever visited him and his wife; held, this testimony was properly admit-
ted to affect his credibility).
98. Asadorian Rug Co. v. Chandeysson, 144 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. App. 1940) (Action
on account); State v. Hayes, note 32, supra (State may impeach defendant-witness
in statutory rape case even by proof of specific acts of misconduct, if the proof
reflects upon the witness).
99. State v. Collins, 117 Mo. App. 658, 93 S.W. 325 (1906) (Defendant had cir-
culated stories that prosecutrix had been caught using a pump or syringe to do away
with an unborn child, he thereby charging her with fornication with parties unknown
in violation of Mo. REv. STAT. § 2258 (1899).
100. Markowitz v. Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119 (Mo. App. 1927) (Action for money
advanced for expenses of deceased, objection being raised and error cited to the
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solitary case it was declared that evidence of a witness who was under
the influence of a narcotic at the time of the occurrence to which he
testified, or was under such influence at the time he testified, cannot be
received as reliable, and the jury should be warned as to the credence to
be given it. There is a definite split of authority across the nation as to the
admissibility of expert testimony to show the mental deterioration in-
volved in drug addiction,10 2 but the better principle apparently favors
admission. After all, the purpose of all evidence (which cannot be
reiterated often enough in analysis and coinparison of conflicting rules
and cases) is truth, and the widespread publicity in periodicals in recent
years should be sufficient to presume judicial notice. Missouri's rule
appears to have a sound footing, particularly in view of the ever-strength-
ening trend toward wider acceptance of expert testimony. As an after-
thought, if evidence as to the poor capability for truth of a drug addict is
to be admitted, it would logically follow that testimony of an expert
given as to statements of a patient under the influence of "truth serum"'03
should be afforded more than "witch doctor" credence. This, however, is
still an open question in Missouri.
Drunkenness is the other habit which is admissible to impeach a
witness in Missouri, although, like drug addiction, the subject apparently
has been touched but once directly, that being in Sanders v. Armour &
Co.10 4 an action for the loss of the services of plaintiff's wife. She was
employed at defendant's Springfield poultry plant, her job being to pick
pinfeathers from chickens, then carry the chickens so cleaned to the
next processing stage, this requiring a walk of about thirty feet across
a customarily dry concrete floor. On the day of the accident the floor
was still wet after being sprayed with disinfectant, and plaintiff's wife fell.
The question with which we are concerned here involved the testimony of
defendant's witness E.K., who it was proved, had been drinking intoxicat-
ing liquor on the morning of the accident. Such evidence was held admis-
sible, not to impeach, but as affecting credibility of witness testifying as to
what transpired on that particular morning. Basically, is there a differ-
admission of expert testimony as to the reliability of a witness who vas a drug
addict).
101. Note, Witness-Credibility-Drug Addiction as Grounds of Attack, 16 ST.
Louis L. Rxv. 336 (1931); Hale, Witnesses-Narcotics as Affecting Credibility, 16 So.
CAra. L. Rxv. 333 (1943), collecting cases at 334.
102. Id.
103. Sodium amytal.
104. 292 S.W. 443 (Mo. App. 1927).
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ence between evidence tending to discredit (impeach) and the same
evidence given to negative credibility?
The mental weakness of a witness should always be admitted to dis-
credit his testimony, and it has been so held in Missouri in State v.
Pierson,10 5 a prosecution for murder in connection with the death of a
woman which occurred when a St. Louis hotel was set afire by defendant
and three others to obtain the insurance proceeds. At defendant's former
trial, state's witness B.K. testified, but she was placed in a mental institu-
tion shortly thereafter. Her testimony was preserved and placed in
evidence at this trial, defendant excepting to exclusion of impeaching
testimony to show that she had been mentally incompetent at the first
trial. Held, a witness' mental defects, as well as moral defects, may be
shown to impeach his testimony. The well-reasoned opinion of Cooley, C.,
examined carefully the cases from other jurisdictions and placed Missouri
in the common sense category.
In passing, it might be observed that one can impeach himself,
1 0 6
this being almost too elementary to deserve more than scant attention.
Also, Missouri does not permit introduction of extrinsic evidence to
impeach a witness' character. It has been held twice that letters are in-
admissible to impeach,1 07 and once that a signed statement by a female
that she spent the night with one man while married to another is, like-
wise inadmissible.' 0 8 The modern bible of evidence' 0 9 fully expounds
the preceding averment, but a swift reference to the policy rule against
impeachment on the basis of specific acts- of misconduct should clarify
the point: if such acts cannot be proved on cross-examination of the
105. 337 Mo. 475, 85 S.W.2d 48 (1935).
106. Van Graafieland v. Wright, 286 Mo. 414, 228 S.W. 465 (1920) (Bill in equity
to set aside sheriff's sale and deed, defendant impeaching himself by confessing that
he had falsely stated in his deed to another party-defendant, for the purpose of
deceiving a possible purchaser, that he had sold the land for a specific sum).
107. State v. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347 (1881) (Murder; letter in which defendant
purportedly planned it; held, properly excluded unless there is proof it was written
by him); Page v. Payne, notes 82 and 85, supra (Letters tending to show plaintiff was
the father of an illegitimate child ten years before the trial was a matter, the admis-
sibility of which, was within the trial court's discretion, it not abusing its discretion by
the exclusion, since the Statute of Limitations barred prosecution).
108. Willgues v. Pennsylvania R.R., 318 Mo. 28, 298 S.W. 817 (1927) (Action for
wrongful death of husband killed in railroad accident as he was switching cars,
defendant attempting to introduce the plaintiff wife's signed statement admitting she
made a trip to Texas with one H, living with him as his wife; held, properly excluded,
since a witness cannot be impeached by showing commission of specific immoral acts).
109 3 WiGMORE, op cit., note 6, supra, §§ 979 and 987.
1955]
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
witness, the next step down the ladder cannot be taken by proving the
same thing by outside sources. The maxim that the courts cannot do
indirectly what they connot do directly, still has application.
Prior Conviction of Crime
Although it is now a settled rule of law in Missouri, a witness' prior
conviction could not always be shown either by cross-examination or
by the record. The early rule was that a prior conviction could be
proved only by the record of judgment of conviction,110 parol proof being
inadmissible if the witness or party offering him objected to such verbal
proof."' But the objection must have been made. 112 So, also, a witness
formerly could not be asked whether he had been convicted of a crime
and imprisoned, 1 3 although the propriety of this restriction was ques-
tioned.114 A similarly unenlightening squabble briefly endured involved
the question whether a witness could be asked about a prior plea of
guilty to a criminal charge.115 The entire conglomeration of decisions pro
and con revealed only two discernible aspects: (1) the rule against parol
110. State v. Rugan, note 47, supra, citing GREENLEAP, EVIDENCE §§ 377 and 457.
111. State v. Lewis, 80 Mo. 110 (1883) (Murder of wife; state's witness giving
negative answer on cross-examination to question as to whether he had not been
convicted of grand larceny and sent to the penitentiary, defendant then offering to
prove by one W that he had seen witness in the penitentiary as a convict; held, when
parol evidence is objected to, the record must be produced to prove the conviction
of a witness, whether the testimony is offered to affect his competency or his
credibility); State v. Douglass, 81 Mo. 231 (1883), reversing 15 Mo. App. 1 (Murder
by Negress of man with whom she had been living, believing him guilty of inter-
course with another woman, defendant objecting to question asked her witness M.F.
if witness had been confined in the workhouse; held, conviction of defendant's
witness cannot be proved by parol where defendant objects).
112. State v. Rockett, 87 Mo. 666 (1885), reversing 16 Mo. App. 554 (1884)(Robbery; objection not raised to question as to prior conviction; held, subsequent
admission over objection of record showing such conviction was proper).
113. State v. McGraw, note 55, supra; State v. Brent, 100 Mo. 531, 13 S.W. 874
(1890) (Assault with intent to kill); State v. Hale, 156 Mo. 102, 56 S.W. 881 (1900)
(Burglary; held, it was error to inquire as to whether defendant had previously
pleaded guilty to larceny, since such offense had no connection whatever with the
charge against him).
114. State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S.W. 832 (1890) (Murder committed during
burglary, co-defendant being asked if he had not been in the penitentiary; held,
admission of the question was not error, for when the purpose is only to discredit
the witness, it is not necessary to produce the record to prove a previous conviction).
115. State v. Sasseen, 75 Mo. App. 197 (1898) (Minister of thirty years' standing
prosecuted for petit larceny, he stating his years of standing in the church; held,
proper to inquire on cross-examination as to prior pleas of guilty to larceny charges,
since state had the right to meet defendant on his own ground and show acts in-
consistent with religious principles); contra: State v. Hale, note 113, supra.
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proof of prior convictions was crumbling"16 and was soon to be over-
thrown, and (2) the record of conviction was always admissible as im-
peaching evidence. The former occurred in the form of express statute,"-7
the latter being graphically illustrated by a comfortably strong series of
cases prior to the statute.
Probably the first case where a record of conviction of prior criminal
offense was admitted to impeach a witness in Missouri was that of Deer v.
State,118 an indictment for riot for wrecking a house of ill repute,
defendants apparently being dissatisfied "patrons" rather than wild-eyed
reformers. They offered the record of conviction of the "madam" for
having kept a bawdy house; and it was held admissible as bearing on her
credibility. A similar theory was initially applied to a defendant-witness
for the first time a generation thereafter,"19 and from then until the legis-
lative passage and judicial interpretation of the forerunner of the present
statute, there was no question as to the admissibility of the record of
conviction for witness-impeachment purposes.1 20
The modern rule was fashioned by the legislature in 1895, and has
been incorporated in the subsequent statutory revisions.' 2 1 The revision
currently in vogue 22 reads as follows:
"491.050. Convicts competent witnesses-conviction may be
proved to affect credibility, how: Any person who has been con-
victed of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent
witness; but the conviction may be proved to affect his credi-
116. State v. Miller, note 114, supra; State v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 S.W. 12
(1894) (Murder of white man by Negro under inexcusable circumstances; held, it
is proper in a criminal cause to discredit a witness by asking how often he has been
in the county jail under criminal sentences, it being unnecessary to produce the
record of convictions to impeach).
117. Mo. Laws, p. 284 (history traced in 28 V.A.M.S. § 491.050 (1949).
118. 14 Mo. 348 (1851).
119. State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. 505 (1882), Teversing 11 Mo. App. 91 (1881) (Burglary
and larceny).
120. State v. Rockett, note 112, supra; State v. Loehr, 93 Mo. 103, 5 S.W. 696 (1887)
(Petit larceny of fifty pounds of iron; prior conviction of similar offense held,
admissible to impeach defendant as witness); State v. Nelson, 98 Mo. 414, 11 S.W.
997 (1889) (Assault with intent to rob; former conviction of felony held, properly
admitted); State v. Minor, 117 Mo. 302, 22 S.W. 1085 (1893) (Burglary: record of
conviction may be admitted against defendant because he stands on same ground
as any other witness); State v. Dyer, note 47, supra; State v. Carr, 146 Mo. 1, 47
S.W. 790 (1898) (Attempted burglary; held, when one is indicted as an habitual
criminal, evidence of his former conviction is admissible to discredit him as a witness
and to enable the jury, on conviction, to fix the punishment).
121. Op. cit., note 117, supra.
122. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1949).
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bility, either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon
which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry,
and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his
answer."
The foregoing words should have conclusively settled all previous con-
troversies as to just what was admissible to impeach any witness, be he
defendent or other, on the ground of conviction of crime in the past.
It almost did, but, like any general rule, there were loopholes needing
closing by judicial interpretation. 23 The cases upholding the statute by
interpretation are legion, 24 with exceedingly few exceptions involved
123. See infra.
124. Chouteau Land & Lumber Co. v. Chrisman, 172 Mo. 610, 72 S.W. 1062 (1903)(Action in ejectment, prior plea of guilty by defendant to charge of stealing timber
admitted); State v. Thornhill, 174 Mo. 364, 74 S.W. 832 (1903) (Grand larceny, de-
fendant employing confidence game on aged man; prior conviction of gambling,
admitted); State v. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2, 76 S.W. 979 (1903) (Rape, prosecutrix testifying
that defendant lured her into house next door on pretext of having sick sister,
defendant testifying that prosecutrix approached him as he sat on steps and asked
him if he felt able to "go the route," he answering that he "never refused;" held,
prior conviction of crime admissible); State v. Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 S.W. 21 (1905)
(Murder of father-in-law; held a witness may be impeached for conviction of crime
in another state); State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S.W. 746, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 576
(1905) (Murder of non-union man by union member during hack drivers' strike;
prior conviction of assault with intent to kill, admitted); State v. Spivey, 191 Mo.
87, 90 S.W. 81 (1905) (Murder of fellow-employee at sawmill; former conviction of
defendant may be inquired into); State v. Woodward, note 47, supra; State v. Bar-
rington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S.W. 235 (1906) (Murder; evidence of workhouse sentence
for prior conviction of misdemeanor, admitted); State v. Brooks, 202 Mo. 106, 100
S.W. 416 (1907) (Murder; prior conviction of manslaughter, admitted); State v.
Arnold, 206 Mo. 589, 105 S.W. 641 (1907) (Assault with intent to kill; prior conviction
of carrying concealed pistol held, proper); State v. Kennedy, 207 Mo. 528, 106 S.W.
57 (1907) (Murder of fellow-employee at railroad construction camp who had had
sexual intercourse with defendant's concubine; evidence of her adultery with him
held admissible to impeach her testimony); State v. Oliphant, note 68, supra (Convic-
tion of similar misdemeanor in another state, admitted); State v. Hubbard, note 47,
supra; State v. Payne, 223 Mo. 112, 122 S.W. 1062 (1909) (Larceny: prior conviction
of similar offense, admitted); State v. Sovern, 225 Mo. 580, 125 S.W. 769 (1910)
(Assault with intent to kill business competitor; held, prior misdemeanors must be
explicitly stated in order to impeach witness by them); State v. Freeman, 238 Mo.
395, 141 S.W. 1094 (1911) (Manslaughter by debtor of creditor; prior conviction of
possessing counterfeit money is admissible to impeach); Ridenour v. Wilcox Mines
Co., 164 Mo. App. 576, 147 S.W. 852 (1912) (Action for wrongful death; held, prior
pleas of guilty of witness to charges of drunkenness, admissible to impeach where
witness claims no exemption); State v. Campbell, 166 Mo. App. 589, 149 S.W. 1173(1912) (Illegal sale of whisky; held, error not to allow impeachment of state's witness
as to whether he had been drunk, passed whisky into the jail, and had been con-
victed of disturbing the peace); State v. Banks, 258 Mo. 479, 167 S.W. 505 (1914)
(Murder of policeman); State v. Jenkins, 178 S.W. 91 (Mo. 1915) (Stabbing with
intent to kill); State v. Clement, 183 S.W. 1133 (Mo. App. 1916) (Practicing medicine
without license; prior conviction in federal court of misuse of mails admitted; prior
conviction in municipal court of keeping gambling house held harmless error);
State v. Johnson, 192 S.W. 441 (Mo. 1917) (Murder);. State v. Massey, 274 Mo. 578,
204 S.W. 541 (1918) (Robbery, consisting of "rolling" a drunk; held prior conviction
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regarding its workability.125 The major case of State v. Blitz, 126 one of
of accomplice in same crime was admissible to impeach defendant); Day v. Lusk,
219 S.W. 597 (Mo. 1920) (Action for personal injuries by train passenger in derailed
car; held, conviction in another state is admissible as impeaching evidence); State
v. Wicker, note 47, supra; Stack v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223 S.W. 89
(1920) (Action for personal injuries resulting from collision of automobile and
delivery wagon; held, when a witness admitted that he was convicted of a certain
crime, the record of conviction became inadmissible); State v. McBride, notes 47
and 56, supra; State v. Stokes, 288 Mo. 539, 232 S.W. 106 (1921) (Seduction; record
of defendant's conviction of stealing watermelons when he was fourteen years old
held properly admitted to impeach him as witness); State v. Saunders, 288 Mo. 640,
232 S.W. 973 (1921) (Larceny of poultry; record of conviction of similar crime in
another state, admitted); State v. Heimbaugh, 249 S.W. 445 (Mo. App. 1923) (Illegal
manufacture of whisky; held conviction of similar offense, admissible); State v.
Merrell, 263 S.W. 118 (Mo. 1924) (Murder of policeman during escape following
robbery; held, prior convictions are admissible, without regard to whether they are
felonies or misdemeanors); State v. Taylor, 266 S.W. 1017 (Mo. App. 1924) (Illegal
possession of liquor); State v. Ross, note 47, supra; State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268
S.W. 83 (1924) (Driving while intoxicated; prior convictions cannot be proved unless
defendant offers self as witness); State v. Frost, 289 S.W. 895 (Mo. 1926) (Larceny
of "Greasy Spoon" restaurant; held, if defendant admits only one prior conviction,
state may show he had been convicted more than once); State v. Miller, 292 S.W.
440 (Mo. 1927) (Forgery of promissory note; prior conviction of embezzlement,
admitted); State v. Zoller, note 82, supra; State v. Dalton, 23 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1929)
(Illegal transportation of liquor); State v. Harrison, 24 S.W.2d 985 (1930) (Driving
while intoxicated; state can prove more convictions than defendant-witness admits);
State v. Meeks, note 47, supra (Reformation since prior conviction impeached by
records of subsequent convictions); Myles v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 52 S.W.2d
595 (Mo. App. 1932) (Action for personal injuries by alighting streetcar passenger;
held, where a witness admits a prior conviction, the record of such conviction be-
comes inadmissible); State v. Lonon, 331 Mo. 591, 56 S.W.2d 378 (1932) (Robbery);
State v. Hawes, 60 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. App. 1933) (Unlawful possession of moonshine
whisky); Jackson v. City of Malden, 72 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. App. 1934) (Personal injuries
due to street obstruction); State v. Jackson, 336 Mo. 1069, 83 S.W.2d 87, 103 A.L.R.
339 (1935) (Rape of white woman by Negro; held, where the state waived its right
to prove prior convictions under the habitual criminal statute, it may, nevertheless,
cross-examine defendant-witness as to such prior convictions to affect his credibility
as a witness); State v. Mitchell, 86 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1935) (Statutory rape); State v.
Bagby, notes 57, 58 and 93, supra; State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632, 108
A.L.R. 838 (1936) (Murder); State v. Ransom, 340 Mo. 165, 100 S.W.2d 294 (1936)
(Robbery: state may show not only that prior convictions existed, but also for what
crimes); Collins v. Leahy, 102 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App. 1937) (Personal injury); State
v. Brown, 165 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1942) (Assault with intent to do great bodily harm);
State v. Graves, note 49, supra (Statute permitting proof of prior conviction of crime
either by cross-examination or by the record held not a bill of attainder in violation
of constitutional provisions); State v. Holloway, 355 Mo. 217, 195 S.W.2d 662 (1946)
(Murder: state may inquire into details of prior convictions and show particular
crimes of which defendant-witness has been convicted, to impeach him); State v.
Parrish, 214 S.W2d 558 (Mo. 1948) (Assault with intent to kill); State v. Jones,
note 53, supra; State v. Pierce, 236 S.W.2d 314 (1951) (Statutory rape).
125. State v. Wagner, 237 S.W. 750 (Mo. 1922) (Larceny of automobile; held, in
order to impeach, the judgment of conviction must be valid, and one admittedly void
on its face is inadmissible); State v. Shelton, 314 Mo. 333, 284 S.W. 433 (1926), noted
in 21 ILL. L. Rav. 746 (1927) (Illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquors; held, a
record of conviction may not be shown when an appeal of such conviction was pend-
ing at the time); Daggs v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 51 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App.
1932) (Assault action by job-seeker who was shot by defendant's agent apprehensive
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the most oft-quoted decisions in our judicial annals, was the baptism of
the statute by the bench. Therein, defendant had been convicted of grand
larceny in the theft of certain money from one H while they were dis-
cussing grain sales in the Board of Trade at Kansas City. He cited as
error the admission of questions asked his witnesses on cross-examina-
tion as to whether they had not been convicted of certain misdemeanors,
consisting of fighting, frequenting bawdy houses, etc. It was held that the
term "criminal offense" means both felonies and misdemeanors, and
evidence of conviction of either is admissible to affect a witness' credi-
bility.
The tenet that all "criminal offenses" were admissible to impeach a
witness did not hold completely true at early common law, for then
only "infamous" crimes were so admissible.' 27 Missouri's courts former-
ly applied this rule, but not without doubt on occasion. 128 The enabling
statute 29 had some influence, for it made no discrimination between
felonies and misdemeanors, and this has ultimately been the distillate of
thought of the bench. Felonies, of course, have always been admissible,
the courts at times holding that prior convictions must have involved
felonies in order to impeach. 8 0 On other occasions the prior convictions
that plaintiff was possible thief and assailant, defendant seeking to prove plaintiff
had been convicted of other crimes than he had admitted; held, exclusion was not
error, since defendant did not distinguish between crimes and violations of ordi-
nances).
126. 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027 (1903).
127. See generally, as to what constitutes a crime for witness-impeachment
purposes: Note, What Constitutes Crime for Conviction of Which Witness May be
Impeached, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 274; see also 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 74 and 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 156.
128. State v. Warren, 57 Mo. App. 502 (1894) (Affray: prior conviction must be
for infamous crime to impeach); State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S.W. 1124 (1895)
(Murder; held, conviction of gambling not admissible to impeach, since gambling is
not an infamous crime); State v. Dyer, notes 47 and 120, supra (Prior conviction of
petit larceny, admissible, since it was infamous crime at common law); State v.
Manning, 87 Mo. App. 78 (1901) (Prosecution for issuing unlawful prescription for
intoxicating liquors; prior conviction must be of infamous crime to impeach); State
v. Prendible, 165 Mo. 329, 65 S.W. 559 (1901) (Assault with intent to kill: held, prior
conviction for assault and battery, inadmissible, since it is not an infamous crime);
O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Company, 106 Mo. App. 215, 80 S.W. 304 (1904) (Action
for personal injuries by streetcar passenger suffering fall when alighting; held, prior
arrest, conviction, and fine for assault improper to impeach witness, since the crime
was not infamous); State v. Wright, 236 S.W. 395 (Mo. App. 1922) (Indictment for
gambling: prior conviction of gambling admissible even though gambling was not
an infamous crime).
129. Note 117, supra.
130. State v. Smith, 125 Mo. 2, 28 S.W. 181 (1894) (Assault with intent to kill:
prior conviction of assault and battery held inadmissible, since the conviction must
have been for a felony); Gardner v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 135 Mo. 90, 36
S.W. 214 (1896) (Action for personal injuries by employee, defendant attempting
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admitted have not specified as to felonies or misdemeanors.1 31 A long
series of cases since passage of the statute has apparently admitted prior
convictions of misdemeanors, despite the nature of the conviction or the
ridiculous absence of correlation of such convictions with the witness'
truth-telling qualities.1 32 This can be carried to the grossest extremes,
however, as three cases graphically depict. Stack v. General Baking
Co.13 3 was an action for personal injuries resulting from a collision of
plaintiff's automobile with defendant's delivery wagon. Defendant was
permitted to show, on cross-examination, that plaintiff's witness C had
once been convicted of selling liquor on Sunday. In Daggs v. St. Louis-
San Francisco R.R.,134 defendant railroad was refused permission to im-
peach plaintiff as a witness on the ground of prior conviction merely
because it did not distinquish on the cross-examination question between
crimes and violations of ordinances. The classic case of them all, however,
is State v. Stokes,13 5 a prosecution for seduction of a nineteen-year old
girl. In that case it was incredulously admitted, to impeach the defendant
as a witness, that he had been convicted of stealing watermelons when
he was a boy fourteen years old! Are there no limits to the ridiculous
level the courts may sink when they fall asleep as to relevancy? Will
we continue to restrain general character inquiries to truth and veracity,
yet continue to admit misdemeanors such as this which have no relevancy
whatever to the issues directly in point, namely, the capacity of the
witness for truth and veracity, and the nature of the charge at bar?
to impeach plaintiff's witness by proof of his prior conviction of misdemeanor; held,
crime must be infamous to impeach); State v. Forsha, note 24, supra; State v. Brooks,
note 124, supra.
131. State v. Payne, note 124, supra (Larceny); State v. Freeman, note 124, supra
(Possession of counterfeit money); State v. Clement, note 124, supra (Misuse of
mails); State v. Merrell, note 124, supra.
132. State v. Blitz, note 124, supra (Fighting and frequenting bawdy houses,
admitted); Chouteau Land & Lumber Co. v. Chrisman, note 124, supra (Stealing
timber, admitted); State v. Thornhill, note 124, supra (Prior gambling, admitted);
State v. Heusack, note 124, supra; State v. Barrington, note 124, supra; State v. Arnold,
note 124, supra (Carrying concealed pistol, admitted); State v. Kennedy, note 124,
supra (Adultery, admitted); State v. Oliphant, notes 68 and 124, supra (Violation of
liquor law in another state, admitted); Ridenour v. Wilcox Mines Co., note 124, supra
(Drunkenness and consorting with prostitutes, admitted, where witness claimed no
exemption); State v. Saunders, note 124, supra (Stealing chickens in another state,
admitted on similar charge to impeach defendant-witness); State v. Zoller, notes 82
and 124, supra (Illegal sale of liquor, admitted); Myles v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., note 124, supra (Petit larceny, admitted).
133. Note 124, supra.
134. Note 125, supra.
135. Note 124, supra,
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As this observer sees it, the only correlation between women and water-
melons is the letter "W"!136
The question of time sometimes arises in proving prior convictions:
how long is a "reasonable time" between prior conviction and present
action to preclude admission of a witness' previous erring on the ground
of remoteness? The only three cases in point which were discovered
leave no clear-cut dividing line. Naturally, a recent conviction is proper
to admit, for it bears on present character.137 Missouri has allowed con-
victions ten to twelve years beforehand to impeach a witness in a prosecu-
tion for violation of the prohibition law;1 8 nineteen years in an action
for personal injuries where the witness has also admitted running gam-
bling places more recently, thus negativing the idea of reformation; 180
and thirty-five years in a bewhiskered action for personal injuries. 140
In the latter instance a man forty-three years of age was impeached by
the showing that he had been in reform school when an eight-year old
boy! This type of thing could not happen today because of the rule
against judgments of juvenile delinquency being considered as "crimes"
for impeachment purposes, 41 and rehabilitating evidence might enter
the picture, but it would be confined to truth and veracity. How juvenile
can we become where relevancy is concerned?
Convictions in another jurisdiction have long been held to be admis-
sible to impeach a witness in Missouri.142 Thus, if convictions of almost
anything are permissible to impeach a witness, are we reaching the point
of view that anything which is enjoyable is either illegal, immoral, or
unhealthy? Hardly. There are certain definite exclusions in the law
as to what may be shown as a conviction as well as the rigid requirement
that nothing less than the conviction of the party sought to be impeached
may be shown.
Mere violations of municipal ordinances are not "convictions of
criminal offenses" within the true meaning of the law, so as to discredit
136. See thorough collection of cases in 28 V.A.M.S. § 491.050 (1949).
137. 3 WiGmoPE, op. cit., note 6, supra, § 987.
138. State v. Taylor, note 24, supra.
139. Collins v. Leahy, note 124, supra.
140. Jackson v. City of Malden, note 124, supra.
141. See infra.
142. State v. Heusack, notes 124 and 132, supra; State v. Oliphant, notes 68, 124,
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a witness because of them, although this was not always so; but it was
so held as early as 1889 and is definitely the absolute rule today.143 The
line of distinction is drawn capably in Meredith v. Whillock, 144 an action
for damages for assault and battery committed in a barber shop. The
court held it error to permit the cross-examination of a witness as to his
having pleaded guilty to violations of city ordinances, for an ordinance is
a regulation adopted by a municipal corporation and not a law in the
legal sense. Annotations collecting the cases reveal the reason for this
distinction, agreeing that a violation of an ordinance results primarily
in a debt due the municipal corporation rather than a penalty for violating
the rights of society in general.
145
Just as a violation of an ordinance is construed by the courts not to
be a crime against society, at least for purposes of impeaching a witness,
so, also, is an adjudication of juvenile delinquency not considered a
"crime" for impeachment purposes. The leading case which lays down
this fundamental is that of State ex rel. Sharte v. Trimbe,146 involving
certiorari to quash the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals on an
information for rape which was dismissed, and for juvenile delinquency.
The facts are these: one W, a boy under seventeen years of age, was
charged with rape and being a juvenile delinquent: the first count was
dismissed, but a finding of delinquency was entered. The trial court
143. State v. Taylor, 98 Mo. 240, 11 S.W. 570 (1889) (Assault with intent to kill;
held, evidence of violation of ordinance by frequenting bawdy house was not ad-
missible to impeach); State v. Sovern, note 124, supra (Prior fines for assault not
admitted); State v. Carroll, note 124, supra (Witnesses may be asked whether he
had been drunk, passed whisky into the jail, and been convicted of disturbing the
peace); State v. Mills, 272 Mo. 526, 199 S.W. 131 (1917) (Murder: held, prior conviction
of violating city vagrancy ordinance, inadmissible); Custer v. Shackelford, 225 S.W.
450 (Mo. 1920) (Bill in equity to rescind sale of land because of vendor's fraud; held,
impeachment of plaintiff by showing that she had allowed poultry to run at large in
violation of city ordinance was harmless error, since defendant's own testimony
revealed he was guilty of misrepresentations); State v. Roberts, 311 Mo. 521, 278
S.W. 971 (1925) (Bank robbery; held, prior conviction of violation of vagrancy ordi-
nance inadmissible); City of St. Louis v. Tanner, 143 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. App. 1940)
(Disturbance of peace; held, prior violation of peace disturbance ordinance inadmis-1
sible); Hoffman v. Graber, 153 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. App. 1941) (Slander arising from
controversy over division of Synagogue; held, prior conviction of peace disturbance
ordinance violation, not admissible to impeach plaintiff); Stokes v. Wabash RR.,
355 Mo. 602, 197 S.W.2d 304 (1946) (Action for personal injuries resulting from
pedestrian's being struck by train; held, it was proper to refuse to admit plaintiff's
arrest and police court convictions of violations of city ordinances).
144. 173 Mo. App. 542, 158 S.W. 1061 (1913).
145. Note, Violation of Municipal Ordinance as a Public Offense or Crime, 48
L.R.A. (N.S.) 156; see also Note, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 327.
146. 33 Mo. 888, 63 S.W.2d 37 (1933).
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granted an appeal to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, where the judg-
ment was reversed because of supposedly erroneous admission of evi-
dence of sexual intercourse between W and prosecutrix after the date of
the act charged in the information. Relator, the Attorney-General, con-
tended this was error, and counsel for W contended that W had been
convicted of a felony, and the appeal, therefore, should have been trans-
ferred directly to the Supreme Court. The court held that a juvenile
court's judgment can only declare a child a delinquent, though the con-
duct charged consists of violations of criminal statutes, and such judg-
ments do not constitute a "conviction of criminal offense". A deviation
occurred later, 47 in that instance the court allowing the showing of
witness' having served a term in the reformatory prior to the passage of
the juvenile delinquency statute, but this will not likely happen again.' 48
In impeaching a witness by proof of participation in a crime, whether
by extrinsic evidence or his own admission, it is an absolute requisite
that conviction be shown. An arrest alone is not enough, although a
witness can be asked on cross-examination if he has not been arrested and
sent to prison.149 The recent unusual case of State v. Green'"° is illustra-
tive. Therein, defendant was arrested in 1934 for robbery of a streetcar
147. Jackson v. City of Malden, notes 124 and 140, supra.
148. State v. Coffman, 360 Mo. 782, 230 S.W.2d 761 (1950) (Statutory rape:
record of convictions of witnesses in juvenile court for petit larceny held inadmis-
sible, since no "crime" occurred); see further, 147 A.L.R. 446.
149. State v. Howard, 102 Mo. 142, 14 S.W. 937 (1890) (Murder; held, the mere
fact that a witness had been arrested is inadmissible to discredit him); State v.
Taylor, 118 Mo. 153, 24 S.W. 449 (1893) (Rape of white girl by Negro; enraging facts:
held, a witness may be asked whether he has been arrested and sent to jail for
stealing billiard balls); State v. Pratt, 121 Mo. 566, 26 S.W. 556 (1894) (Forgery of
deed: held, witness may be asked if he has not been in jail for stealing a pitchfork,
and, also, if he had not been put in jail for assaulting and beating a poor woman
on a streetcar); State v. Martin, note 116, supra (Witness may be asked how often
he has been in jail on sentence for crime); State v. Grant, 144 Mo. 56, 45 S.W. 1102
(1898) (Assault with intent to kill arising from argument over religious meeting,
defendant calling prosecuting witness a "damned liar" and altercation following;
held, it is incompetent to show that defendant-witness had been arrested for illegally
selling liquor); State v. Tracy, 284 Mo. 619, 225 S.W. 1009 (1920) (Burglary of bank);
State v. White, 299 Mo. 599, 253 S.W. 724 (1923) (Exhibiting dangerous weapon,
defendant showing that he had supported sheriff on prior election, to show the
improbability of truth of charge; held, on special facts, a prior arrest may be shown);
State v. Bounds, 216 Mo. App. 236, 262 S.W. 411 (1924) (Violation of prohibition law;
held, witness cannot be asked whether he illegally manufactured whisky in Ark-
ansas); State v. Ross, notes 47 and 124, supra (Previous convictions, but not mere
arrests, may be shown); State v. Perkins, notes 29 and 82, supra; Smith v. Fine, 351
Mo. 1179, 175 S.W.2d 761 (1943) (Action for personal injuries brought by pedestrian
struck by automobile; evidence that driver was arrested because of the accident held
not admissible to impeach him).
150. 236 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1951).
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operator. He escaped from jail and went west, nothing further happening
to him legally detrimental until 1947, when he was convicted in federal
court for draft evasion during World War II. Upon release he was re-
turned to Missouri for this trial, where he complained of the admission
of a purported confession in 1934, admitting six separate robberies. It
has held that evidence of prior crimes, where there was no charge or
conviction, is inadmissible to impeach a defendant as a witness or to test
his credibility. That prior arrests are not admissible as evidence to im-
peach a witness is not only the Missouri rule, but also is the general rule,
and is backed by the best authority.' 51
If arrests are inadmissible, it follows that mere trouble with the
police, 52 resisting attempting arrest by an armed but unauthorized
officer who has no warrant,153 and mere surveillance by the police' 54 are
likewise inadmissible. A further conclusion is that, since convictions only
can be shown, evidence of a charge of crime, information, or indictment
cannot be shown unless a conviction followed, but this rule has not been
unanimous in the decisions announced.' 55 The overwhelming weight of
151. 3 WiGmoP, op. cit., note 6, supra § 980a; the cases are collected in 13 Ann.
Cas. 643; Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 257; and in 6 AL.R. 1608, as supplemented by 25 AL.R.
340, 103 A.L.R. 364, and 161 A.L.R. 233.
152. Daggs v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., notes 125, 134, and 152, supra (Trouble
with officers in past does not affect witness' credibility); but held, incredibly, in
Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., note 95, supra, that prior "scrapes" other than
those plaintiff had admitted on direct examination were admissible to impeach him.
153. State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S.W. 637 (1897) (Murder: held, evidence of
defendant's previously resisting arrest by an armed justice of the peace who had
neither warrant nor authority, was inadmissible).
154. State v. Barker, 249 S.W. 75 (Mo. 1923) (Burglary and larceny of automobile:
held, error to show defendant-witness had been under police surveillance as car
thief).
155. Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 236 (1887) (Action
for malicious prosecution: held, prior indictment for feloniously removing liquors
on which tax had been paid, when prosecution as to defendant was dismissed though
he had pleaded guilty, when he testified, as government witness, held, admissible);
State v. Weisman, 238 Mo. 547, 141 S.W. 1108 (1911) (Prosecution for fraudulent
voting registration; held, evidence that a witness has been indicted is not competent
to impeach him); State v. Potts, 239 Mo. 403, 144 S.W. 495 (1912) (Prosecution for
establishing and maintaining crap table; held, where a prosecution for the same
offense was pending against state's principal witness, it was proper to ask him
whether he had arranged with the prosecuting attorney to dismiss the charges
against him in consideration of his turning state's evidence); State v. Banks, note
124, supra (Comnission of other crimes without convictions following held inadmis-
sible); State v. Baker, 262 Mo. 689, 172 S.W. 350 (1914) (Embezzlement: prior in-
vestigation of witness by federal grand jury held inadmissible to impeach); State v.
Barri, 199 S.W. 136 (Mo. 1917) (Robbery: held, mere indictment or charge of
criminal offense not admissible); State v. Cole, 213 S.W. 110 (Mo. 1919) (Murder:
held, alleged fact of guilt of statutory rape or seduction not admissible unless con-
viction shown); State v. Edmundson, note 47, supra (Evidence that felony charge
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authority in Missouri upholds it, and there seems to be no doubt that
constriction rather than expansion will follow in the future. The leading
case in the field is State v. Wigger,156 a prosecution for arson in con-
nection with the burning of a saloon, where it was held that questions
as to prior charges, informations, or indictments for crime are improper.
The reason for the rule was given in Kribs v. United Order of Forest-
ers,157 an action on a life insurance policy, wherein defendant asked
plaintiff if he were not "the same Kribs" under indictment for arson.
The court held it cannot be shown that a witness has merely been charged
with an offense by indictment, information, or otherwise, for, until con-
viction, he is presumptively innocent and of prima facie good repute.
Another case often quoted, State v. Pine,158 was a prosecution for rob-
bing the winner of a crap game, defendant complaining of two of his
witnesses, being questioned on cross-examination as to their prior crimes;
one being asked if he had not been arrested for assaulting an officer; and
the other if he were not at the time under a charge of grand larceny for
stealing cattle. These questions were held to be reversible error, since
one is presumed innocent until convicted. Later in the same year (1933)
is pending against witness is inadmissible to impeach him); State v. Hillebrand,
285 Mo. 290, 225 S.W. 1006 (1920) (Murder during robbery: held, witness cannot
be impeached by evidence of criminal offenses supposedly cormitted, of which he
has not been convicted); State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923) (Statutory rape of
underage girl who admitted being a common prostitute: held, it was error to require
witnesses to testify that they were also under indictment or charge for also having
carnal knowledge of prosecutrix); Capps v. Winchester, 286 S.W. 729 (Mo. App.
1926) (Action on account for feeding livestock; held, mere charge of criminal inad-
missible); State v. Tunnell, 296 S.W. 423 (Mo. 1927) (Prosecution for maliciously
shooting into another's dwelling; held charge of felonious assault pending is not
admissible); State v. Hamilton, 340 Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d 642 (1937) (Accessory after
fact of murder; held, pending criminal charge inadmissible); State v. Menz, 341 Mo.
74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937) (Murder during store robbery; held, prior charge of com-
mission of crime inadmissible unless conviction shown); State v. Perkins, notes 29,
82, and 149, supra (Mere charge or arrest inadmissible unless conviction follows);
State v. Spinks, 344 Mo. 105, 125 S.W.2d 60 (1939) (Statutory rape, defendant having
taken two underage girls out, was unable to perform sexual intercourse with one,
but completed it with other after all agreed it was the "thing to do", state attempting
thereafter to show defendant had also had intercourse with another underage girl;
held mere charge of crime inadmissible); State v. York, 142 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. 1940)(Manslaughter: mere charge of crime not admissible); Hoffman v. Graber, note 143,
supra (Mere charge of crime inadmissible); Marrah v. J & R Motor Supply Co., 165
S.W.2d 271 (Mo. App. 1942) (Personal injuries caused by merchandise falling on
plaintiff because of negligence of defendant's employee; held, mere charge of crime
without conviction is not admissible); State v. Leonard, 182 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1944)
(Prosecution for selling liquor without a license; held, prior conviction must be
shown).
156. 196 Mo. 90, 93 S.W. 390 (1906).
157. 191 Mo. App. 524, 177 S.W. 766 (1915).
158. 332 MgQ. 314, 57 S.W.2d 1087 (1933).
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the same court held in State v. Sherry6 9 that a question asked a witness
as to whether he had illegally sold liquor was proper, since credibility
was affected, and admissibility of specific acts tending to impeach a
witness' testimony, if not too remote in time, rests largely in the trial
court's discretion. There is a favorite military phase for an asinine deci-
sion such as this, which should be called by its name: "passing the buck".
The propriety of the rule has only been questioned once since N.R.A.
days, that being in Smith v. Thompsou, 60 an opinion which definitely
detracted from Ellison's luster. In that action for personal injuries it was
determined that, on cross-examination, a witness could properly be asked
a discrediting question as to whether he had been previously convicted
or charged with a crime, the examiner being bound by his answer. Was
this a step forward into the light or a leap backward into darkness?
Whatever the answer, the doctrine of this case is not Missouri law.16 .
It is pseudo-elementary that any conviction shown to impeach must
be proved to be that of the impeached witness. 62 It has been decided
also that when an appeal of a conviction in the trial court is pending, such
record is not admissible to impeach, due to the suspension of status
pending appeal, but this procedure did not escape criticism. 6 3  To
impeach, it would appear that the convicted party must actually begin
sentence, whether it be imprisonment or suspension, since an appeal may
bring reversal, and a new trial may bring acquittal. That has happened
more than once, as any newspaper account of a reasonably famous or
infamous case reveals. It is submitted that a conviction must be definitely
final before it can be offered to impeach.
159. Note 36, supra.
160. Note 32, supra.
161. Notes 155 and 156, supra, and Holden v. Berberich, 351 Mo. 995, 174 S.W.2d
791, 149 A.L.R. 929 (1943) (Action for wrongful death by widow of passenger in
automobile accident where driver was under indictment for driving while intoxi-
cated, in same accident; held, mere arrests or indictments cannot be inquired about
to discredit a witness: reviews prior cases thoroughly to cite Missouri rule); see also
Note, Impeachment of Witness by Showing That He Has Been Indicted, 16 Ann.
Cas. 872.
162. Myles v. St. Louis Public Service Co., notes 124 and 132, supra (Where
plaintiff sues as "Hazel Myles", conviction of "Hazel Miles" is not admissible to
impeach her without establishing that she was the person named in the conviction).
163 State v. Shelton, note 125, supra, adversely noted in 21 ILL. L. Rzv. 746
(1927). In the commentary it was admitted that the entire matter hinged on the inter-
pretation of the word "conviction", which was taken to mean a judgment and
sentence. State v. Meyers, 198 Mo. 252, 94 S.W. 242 (1906) was cited, wherein con-
viction with new trial pending was allowable to impeach convicted party in a
different suit, distinction being afforded to a limited degree in the case reviewed.
1955]
42
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere amounts to practical-
ly the same thing as a plea of guilty or a conviction on the facts by the
jury, and as such it should be treated. No Missouri cases were found
which directly touched this point, but there is more than cursory com-
mentary across the nation.8 4 The prevailing rule is that such evidence is
admissible, this being predicated on the idea that a plea of nolo con-
tendere is, for all practical purposes, a plea of guilty. Since a prior con-
viction can be proved "either by cross-examination or by the record" in
Missouri, it appears probable that this jurisdiction will accept the major-
ity policy of admissibility when the question arises.
The final aspect of prior conviction of crime is that of mitigating such
prior conviction (a form of rehabilitation) by explaining extenuating
circumstances surrounding it or by showing an executive pardon follow-
ing the conviction and sentencing. In Missouri this is not permitted, but
there is not too strong a collection of authoritative cases to back up such a
rule. In State v. Jones,1' 5 defendant was convicted of murder in a stab-
bing which was the outgrowth of a railway labor dispute. The state was
allowed to impeach him as a witness by proving his former conviction of
horse theft. He excepted to the exclusion of facts sought to explain the
conviction. It was held that where a former conviction is admitted in a
criminal case to discredit the accussed as a witness, he cannot show any
facts impeaching the judgment of conviction. The only exception to this
rule is that when a record of prior conviction is admittedly void on its
face, such absence of validity may be shown, for the record should not be
admitted in the first place.' 68 l A somewhat different type of thing was
involved in Maurizi v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 16 7 an action by an
employee for personal injuries incurred when he was struck by a rock
which fell from the mine roof as he and a fellow-employee were attempt-
ing to get a derailed car back on the track. On cross-examination plaintiff
admitted he had pleaded guilty twice to possession of "white mule", but
was permitted to deny that he had been guilty of bootlegging. It was held
that this was not erroneous as an attempt to explain the conviction of
164. Note, Plea of Nolo Contendere, 41 LA. (N.S.) 74; Czaplewski, Admissibility
in Evidence to Impeach Witness of a Conviction Based on Plea of Nolo Contendere,
31 MARQ. L. REv..309 (1948).
165. 249 Mo. 80, 155 S.W. 33 (1913).
166. State v. Wagner, note 125, supra.
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crime. Thus, the entire rule in Missouri rests on one case which, though
pregnant with profundity of logic and wisdom, does not conform to the
modern policy of liberality followed in other jurisdictions and favored by
text-writers, annotators, and cornmentators, 168 though it is the majority
rule. The rationable is that an explanation of a conviction would allow
the witness' uncorroborated oral testimony to refute and contradict the
verity of a court of record.
A definite break in this tightly welded chain in other jurisdictions
occurred in United States v. Boyer,169 a prosecution for obtaining money
under false pretenses, the prosecution seeking to impeach defendant's
testimony by inquiring as to his previous convictions for passing bogus
checks and for embezzlement. He was allowed to explain that the bogus
check charges were due to his secretary's mistake, but he was not allowed
to explain the embezzlement conviction. The appellate court did not
reverse because of the exclusion of explanation of the embezzlement
conviction, holding that the allowance of any explanation of a prior con-
viction is a matter for exercise of the trial court's discretion. This is a
wise course and has received favorable comment. One excellent analy-
sis' 70 points out that the prior conviction offered against a defendant in a
criminal case, purportedly to impeach him as a witness, may inferentially
convict him of the present crime in the eyes of the jury. It is submitted
here, therefore, that the liberal rule of the Boyer case is the fairer rule
and merits careful consideration by the Missouri courts when such situa-
tions arise in this state.
An executive pardon is a parallel situation, but one with which the
Missouri courts have not been squarely confronted, so far as could be
determined by an exhaustive examination of the cases. However, it
would apparently be governed by the rigid rule of the Jones case, just
as was true of explaining the circumstances of a conviction. Probably
the leading recent case in this field was that of Richards v. United
States,'71 a prosecution for grand larceny. Defendant was cross-examina-
168. 4 WiosmE, EVIDENCE §§ 116, 117 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Pardon or Commuta-
tion as Affecting Proof of Conviction to Impeach Credibility of Witness, 47 L!.RA.
(N.S.) 215; the cases are collected in a thorough annotation in 166 A.L.R. 211.
169. 150 F.2d 595 (App. D.C. 1945), noted in 37 J. Cans. L. 515 (1947) and 19 So.
CALu. L. REV. 129 (1945).
170. Chuhak, Can a Defendant Explain a Previous Conviction Used for Im-
peachment Purposes?, 37 J. Can. L. 515 (1947).
171. 192 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951), noted in 32 B.U.L. REV. 231 (1952), 40 GEo. L.
J. 145 (1951), 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1106 (1952), and 38 VA. L. REv. 235 (1952).
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ed as regarding his prior conviction of unauthorized use of a government
vehicle. He had served honorably in the armed forces during World War
HI for more than a year, thus bringing him within the class of persons
which received a Presidential pardon. The prior conviction was still
allowed to be shown, notwithstanding the pardon, but the dissent believed
that the pardon completely cleansed the conviction. The commentaries1 72
are divided equally as to the propriety of allowing the conviction in spite
of the pardon, but are in agreement that such is the general doctrine across
the nation.173 Whether a pardon actually effaces the fact of the crime is
a matter too academic and philosophical to be concerned with in a treat-
ment of a procedural topic, but it is submitted in passing that a pardon,
being granted by one elected to a political office, may not always be an
amnesty granted from the goodness and purity of the heart for exemplary
behavior. It is further submitted that a pardon should be admitted in
mitigation, but that the conviction should also be admitted, for the jury
then would have all the facts needed to guide it in the weight to give the
testimony of the person so impeached. After all, both parties are entitled
to equal justice, and this holds true as fully for the state in a criminal
prosecution as for the parties litigant in a civil cause.
(To be continued)
172. See note 171, supra.
173. See also Willston, Does Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HAv. L. REv. 647 (1915)
and Notes, 4 CALwF. L. REv. 236 (1916) and 16 CAWiF. L. REv. 161 (1928). See generally
47 LR.A. (N.S.) 215.
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